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The Economics of Bidder Collusion

  • Robert C. Marshall
  • Leslie M. Marx
  • Michael J. Meurer
Chapter
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 194)

Abstract

This Paper highlights many features of collusion at auctions that distinguish it from collusion in posted price markets, including private information by participants as well as the role of the auctioneer as a player in the game. The Susceptibility of different auction schemes to collusion, including multi-unit auctions, is explored. The design of auctions so as to be robust to collusion is also discussed.

Keywords

Reserve Price Price Auction English Auction Ring Member Uniform Price Auction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This is a revised version of “The Economics of Auctions and Bidder Collusion, in Game Theory and Business Applications (Kalyan Chatterjee & William F. Samuelson eds., 2001). The content draws significantly from two earlier papers by authors Marshall and Meurer: “Bidder Collusion: A Basic Analysis of Some Fundamental Issues,” and “Should Bid-Rigging Always be an Antitrust Violation?” We thank Vikram Kumar for helpful research assistance. Robert C. Marshall thanks the Human Capital Foundation (http://www.hcfoundation.rulen/), and especially Andrey Vavilov, for financial support.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert C. Marshall
    • 1
  • Leslie M. Marx
    • 2
  • Michael J. Meurer
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsPennsylvania State UniversityUniversity ParkUSA
  2. 2.Fuqua School of BusinessDuke UniversityDurhamUSA
  3. 3.School of LawBoston UniversityBostonUSA

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