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Parliamentary Voting

  • Simon Hug
Chapter

Abstract

Votes in parliament offer one of the few sources of behavioral data to study members of parliaments (MPs). As a consequence, an increasing number of studies rely on such data and by employing sophisticated methods generate new insights on how MP interact with their constituency, their party and their leaders in parliament. This paper reviews the main strands of research in this field and cautions against a too uncritical use of data on parliamentary voting. First of all, in many parliaments, information on individual voting behavior is not available for all votes; and second, votes by MPs are influenced by myriad of factors like their constituency, their party, etc. In addition, votes can obviously only be observed on objects having been admitted to the agenda. Consequently, to take full advantage of the wealth of information stemming from parliamentary voting, the full context of MPs’ choices has to be taken into consideration.

Keywords

Parliaments Parliamentary voting Decision-making ideology Political parties 

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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Département de science politique et relations internationales, Faculté des sciences économiques et socialesUniversité de GenèveGenève 4Switzerland

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