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Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies

  • Benjamin Nyblade
Chapter

Abstract

In parliamentary democracies, governments are based on bargains among politicians and parties. These bargains, both implicit and explicit, have profound implications not only for who gets into government, but how they govern, how long they endure, and how voters respond. This chapter examines the development and testing of bargaining models of government formation, following its evolution from simple abstract models that rest on strong assumptions to examine more nuanced and complex models of government formation. It focuses in particular on recent theoretical and empirical developments that aim to better capturing the diverse nature of the actors involved in government formation and their various goals, as well as better specify the nature and variation in bargaining processes and bargaining context.

Keywords

Government formation Coalition government Parliamentary democracy 

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouverCanada

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