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Diversifying the Software Stack Using Randomized NOP Insertion

  • Todd Jackson
  • Andrei Homescu
  • Stephen Crane
  • Per Larsen
  • Stefan Brunthaler
  • Michael Franz
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Information Security book series (ADIS, volume 100)

Abstract

Software monoculture is a significant liability from a computer security perspective. Single attacks can ripple through networks and affect large numbers of vulnerable systems. A simple but unusually powerful idea to solve this problem is to use artificial diversity in software systems. After discussing the design space of introducing artificial diversity, we present an in-depth performance analysis of our own technique: randomly inserting non-alignment NOP instructions. We observe that this technique has a moderate performance impact and demonstrate its real world applicability by diversifying a full system stack.

Keywords

Performance Impact Performance Overhead Insertion Probability Translation Lookaside Buffer Instruction Stream 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Parts of this effort have been sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under agreement number D11PC20024, and by a generous gift by Google.

The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation thereon. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of DARPA or Google.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Todd Jackson
    • 1
  • Andrei Homescu
    • 1
  • Stephen Crane
    • 1
  • Per Larsen
    • 1
  • Stefan Brunthaler
    • 1
  • Michael Franz
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of CaliforniaIrvineUSA

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