Abstract
Neoclassical approach is based on the importance of the information problems in order to determine the inter-sequential behavior of agents and the necessity of considering the state as a major player in the strategic game. Using the hypothesis regarding the agents’ rationality, we can examine the optimum way of using the information available at a certain moment in order to make decisions.
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Korres, G.M., Kokkinou, A. (2013). Political Decision in a Game Theory Approach. In: Carayannis, E., Korres, G. (eds) European Socio-Economic Integration. Innovation, Technology, and Knowledge Management, vol 28. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5254-6_4
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