Advertisement

Common External Tariff (CET) and Targeting the Poor in Mali

Chapter
Part of the Insight and Innovation in International Development book series (IIID, volume 4)

Abstract

The WAEMU’s common external tariff (CET) went into effect in January 2000 and is divided into four categories of products with customs duties of 0, 5, 10 and 20%, respectively. This study analyses the “benefits” of this categorisation for the poor, using targeting indicators calculated with the help of data from the Mali 2006 ELIM. For category 0, which is exempt of customs duties, the results indicate that there are proportionally fewer poor people who consume or purchase these products. However, poor consumers benefit more from category 1, made up of basic necessities subject to a 5% customs duty. The targeting is neutral for the products in category 3. The analysis of the percentage of total consumption shows that the poor consume proportionally more goods from category 1, but proportionally fewer goods from categories 0 and 3. The poor in rural areas get more advantages from the reduced duties and taxes on products in categories 0 and 1 when compared with their urban counterparts. The results also show that the poor do not benefit from tax exemptions, with a more marked disadvantage for the rural dwellers than for city dwellers. The key challenge remains to find out how to improve the effects and benefits of the CET in favour of the poor. Other than resolving the difficulties linked to applying the CET and the free movement of goods, improving the pro-poor characteristics of the community tariff structure requires improving the tariff targeting of the poor and the priority allocation of fiscal income obtained in favour of sectors that benefit primarily the poor.

Keywords

Poor People Urban Poor Basic Necessity Custom Duty Tariff Structure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Cadot O., De Melo J. and Olarreaga M. (2004), ‘Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and Poor Countries’, World Bank Economic Review, 18(3):345–366CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Atelier fiscalité de développement au sein de l’UEMOA, Bamako, 6 – 8 DecemberGoogle Scholar
  3. Gautier, Jean-François (2001), ‘Taxation optimale et réformes fiscales dans les PED – Une revue de littérature tropicalisée’, DIAL DT/2001/02Google Scholar
  4. Lavallée, Emanuelle,Anne Olivier, Laure Pasquier-Doumer, Anne-Sophie Robillard (2009), ‘Le ciblage des politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté – Quel bilan des expériences dans les pays en développement’, DIAL Document de travail, marsGoogle Scholar
  5. Touil Mouncif, El Amrani Hassane (2007), ‘Systèmes fiscaux comparés’ FES WAEMU (2005), ‘Note sur la libéralisation des échanges commerciaux au sein de l’UEMOA et la levée des entraves non tarifaires aux échanges’, Réunion des ministres chargés des douanes, de la gendarmerie et de la police, Ouagadougou, 8 – 10 December 2004Google Scholar
  6. World Bank (2007), Tendances et déterminants de la pauvreté au Mali (2001 – 2006) Google Scholar
  7. Yablonski, Jennifer and Michael O’Donnell (2009), ‘Lasting benefits–The role of cash Transfers in tackling child mortality’ Save the Children UK.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© International Development Research Centre 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BamakoBamakoMali
  2. 2.National Institute of StatisticsBamakoMali

Personalised recommendations