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Regulatory Policy at the Crossroads: Mapping an OECD Agenda for the Futures

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Better Business Regulation in a Risk Society

Abstract

Over the past 15 years, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has played a pioneering role in bringing the issue of regulatory reform to the fore. Much has been achieved over the years, with many countries benefitting from the potential offered by quality regulation. Still, the recent crisis exposed massive flaws in regulatory activity, as well as in supervision and enforcement. Other phenomena are also testing the limits of regulatory frameworks. Regulatory policy is currently at the crossroads, and it needs to integrate a broader governance perspective to address current and future challenges. The chapter takes stock of the current debate and discusses possible pathways to address the future–i.e. restoring trust in government through effective regulatory governance. This involves a tighter integration between the organisation and the management of reform. It also requires completing the policy cycle, closing the loop between regulatory design and evaluation of outcomes, with evidence-based approaches to support proportionate decisions, policy coherence and better assessment of the benefits of regulation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This was also often the case, even in those countries where governments explicitly pursued deregulatory policies (Modigliani 1988; Adonis and Hames 1994; Savoie 1994).

  2. 2.

    On the regulatory State, see the classic work by Majone (1994, 1997), Loughlin and Scott (1997), and Moran (2002), and, more recently, Yeung (2010).

  3. 3.

    The paradox can be simplistically referred to the possibility that decisions taken to manage one single risk may create other countervailing risks (Graham and Weiner 1995).

  4. 4.

    Among the many ones that might be possibly mentioned, the volcanic ash crisis in Europe in 2010 is a case in point concerning so-called “systemic” or “catastrophic risks” (Alemanno 2010).

  5. 5.

    Unlike risks related to technological progress, “lifestyle risks” occur because of the everyday actions and behaviour of individuals. They are primarily the result of voluntary decisions to accept risks linked both to activities and substances and cover among other drinking, eating, driving, gambling, smocking and leisure (Planzer and Alemanno 2010).

  6. 6.

    As “meta-policy”, regulatory reform can be considered a set of internal rules setting standards and thresholds that organise the regulatory process, from rule formulation to enforcement, implementation and ex post evaluation of regulations (Morgan 2003; Radaelli 2007).

  7. 7.

    See http://www.oecd.org/regreform (all Website references were last accessed on 23 May 2011 unless otherwise noted).

  8. 8.

    See http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,3349,en_21571361_45507055_1794487_1_1_1_1,00.html.

  9. 9.

    See http://www.oecd.org/gov/regref/eu15.

  10. 10.

    See http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,3746,en_2649_37421_44587035_1_1_1_37421,00.html.

  11. 11.

    See http://www.oecd.org/regreform; OECD (2005).

  12. 12.

     See http://www.oecd.org/document/36/0,3746,en_2649_34141_35035812_1_1_1_1,00.html. SIGMA is a joint initiative of the OECD and the European Commission supporting EU candidates, potential candidates and European Neighbourhood countries in their public administration reforms. See http://www.sigmaweb.org.

  13. 13.

    The event was organised with the support of the Agency for Administrative Simplification (ASA) and the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union; the Bertelsmann Foundation; the European Commission; and the Board of Swedish Industry and Commerce for Better Regulation (NNR).

  14. 14.

    See for instance Alemanno (2011). OECD has also coordinated concrete policy initiatives in terms of international regulatory cooperation in many sectors, such as the environment, corporate governance, biodiversity, climate change, anti-bribery, chemical testing and agricultural commodities.

  15. 15.

    Without being exhaustive, illustrative examples of such research in Europe are Cecot et al. (2008); Nilsson et al. (2008); Hertin et al. (2009); Staronova (2010)—as well as the reports by the UK National Audit Office or the Board of Swedish Industry and Commerce for Better Regulation (NNR). Similar findings have been reported in the framework of the EU15 project, an initiative carried out by the OECD in partnership with the European Commission. See http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3746,en_2649_34141_41909720_1_1_1_1,00.html(last accessed on 2 February 2011).

  16. 16.

    Whether a RIA is effectiveor not does not depend only on the quality of the analysis and the overall RIA system, but also on the political circumstances under which the dossier is elaborated and discussed. The effectiveness of RIA is closely related to the use that is made of it (Johnson 1998; Nutley et al. 2007) and partly escapes what can be achieved through regulatory reform.

  17. 17.

    These mechanisms help decide on the depth of the required analysis. Thresholds on the economic significance of a given proposal are for instance set in the US and Australia. The triage mechanism, originally developed in Canada, consists of a set of formal questions guiding regulators in selecting the proposals. The principle of proportionate analysis, used notably by the European Commission, implies that level of analysis be proportionate to the significance of the likely impacts; the political importance of the initiative; and its stage in the policy development process (EC 2009).

  18. 18.

    See the US President Executive Order 13563 on Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, of 18 January 2011.

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Allio, L., Jacobzone, S. (2012). Regulatory Policy at the Crossroads: Mapping an OECD Agenda for the Futures. In: Alemanno, A., den Butter, F., Nijsen, A., Torriti, J. (eds) Better Business Regulation in a Risk Society. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4406-0_13

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