Abstract
Part V features analyses of justice conceptions and processes in resource exchange. In Chap. 22, Richard Galvin and Charles Lockhart distinguish among types of goods which have significant implications for theories of distributive justice. They provide a general account of two sets of properties on the bases of which goods can be distinguished: fungibility versus nonfungibility and divisibility versus indivisibility. Further, they contend that these distinctions entail complications for structural principles of distributive justice (i.e., principles such as maximin that distribute payoffs to positions). As an example Galvin and Lockhart consider James Fishkin’s (Fishkin, J. S. (1983). Justice, equal opportunity and the family. New Haven: Yale University Press.) discussion of structural principles, arguing that his view (1) that value, structure, and assignment are independent holds only to the degree that the goods considered are fungible and divisible, (2) that structural principles face difficulties beyond those which Fishkin (Fishkin, J. S. (1979). Tyranny and legitimacy: A critique of political theories. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.) identifies and addresses with his principle of nontyranny, since structural principles cannot accommodate highly nonfungible, indivisible goods, and (3) that these difficulties can be managed through the application of a value-sensitivity proviso. The authors show that two important goods, medical care and advanced education, are highly nonfungible and indivisible and thus support the distinctions drawn earlier. Finally, they specify the nature of complementary contributions as well as coordination problems between structural principles and the value-sensitivity proviso in their application to distributive justice issues.
Part of this chapter is reprinted with kind permission from Southern Political Science Association and Cambridge University Press: Galvin, R.F. & Lockhart, C. (1990). Discrete idiosyncratic goods and structural principles of distributive justice. The Journal of Politics, 52, 1182–1204.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See, for example, the discussion of distributive justice in Aristotle (1947, Book V, Chaps. 2 and 3 [1l30b–32b]).
- 3.
Our use of goods corresponds roughly to Ronald Dworkin’s use of resources, and our use of value corresponds roughly to his use of welfare in his two articles on equality (Dworkin 1981). Additionally, this use of well-being enables us to maintain relative neutrality among the most prominent value-theory choices of Western civilization including the Christian notion focusing on the state of the soul, the Aristotelian concern with fulfillment of natural functions, and the classical utilitarian focus on pleasure.
We should point out that the focus of (especially contemporary) accounts of distributive justice does not include all things that affect a person’s well-being, which might include, for example, the love and respect of one’s family and close friends, but instead focus on issues related to the basic structure of society. See Rawls (1977).
Although not central to our present concerns, we might also speak of “burdens” or “liabilities,” that is, items that diminish a person’s level of well-being. For instance, one important concern of economic theory is how to handle so-called negative externalities, that is, effects of market transactions that negatively affect parties other than those involved in the transaction—negative third-party effects.
Our understanding of resources is consistent with Foa’s, which we understand as follows: resources are the means for attaining goals and meeting demands. These contribute to the quality of one’s life and include those that are both tangible and intangible, human and material, as well as levels of particularism and concreteness (see Foa 1993).
- 4.
We provide a brief account of structural principles at the beginning of Section II.
- 5.
This is not so, of course, in an international perspective, and entrepreneurs engage in arbitrage of various national currencies. But this is not a perspective of relevance for most members of most societies most of the time. Additionally, consider the matter of varying levels of information among consumers. A consumer with better information about alternative products can, in all likelihood, purchase more quality with an equivalent amount of currency.
In a sense, what we refer to as “fungible resources” is similar to what Foa refers to as “universalistic” resources in being at least presumed to provide a benefit to any recipient. But especially given that contemporary discussions of distributive justice focus on goods associated with the basic structure of society, we would be reluctant to make any claims beyond that level of similarity.
- 6.
In a sense, this is the obverse of the dictionary meaning of this term, whereby goods are fungible from a person’s perspective if they are interchangeable. In our sense, goods are fungible to the degree that they contribute to the well-being of a broad range of people, that is, the people, as potential recipients, are interchanged to see for how extensive a proportion of a population an item is a good.
- 7.
See Blalock (1991) for an admittedly brief discussion of divisibility (pp. 29–30).
- 8.
Our use of hip reconstructions as an example draws on British experience in this regard (see Aaron and Schwartz 1984).
- 9.
In the case of vaccinations and antibiotic injections, a minimum quantity must be administered for the patient to derive its anticipated benefits (see our discussion in Section III below).
- 10.
Rescher (1969, pp. 93–95) introduces the idea of indivisible goods but does not discuss the implications developed here.
- 11.
Our distinction should be seen as complementary to that associated with resource theory (see Foa et al. 1993).
- 12.
Our use of the term “Rawlsian maximin” is not intended to imply that Rawls (1971) advocates a purely structural theory of distributive justice since his lexically ordered principles include not only maximin but the “priority of equal liberty” and “fair equality of opportunity” principles as well. Still maximin, even as endorsed by Rawls, is itself clearly a structural principle.
- 13.
Fishkin’s principle of nontyranny stipulates that societies ought to remedy severe deprivations of rights that are avoidable.
- 14.
We do not claim to have provided a comprehensive account of the nature and role of the value-sensitivity proviso. That would appear to be as challenging as providing a rigorous analysis of Fishkin’s principle of nontyranny, which itself does not say much about which distributions it will identify as unjust, and minimally requires elaboration of what counts as a “severe deprivation.” A similarly thorough account of the value-sensitivity proviso would include an exhaustive list of the types of nonfungibility and threshold factors found in DIGs, if not an exhaustive list of DIGs themselves, which in turn presupposes some theory of value. In this chapter, we have tried to remain neutral on questions of value theory, and as a result, our discussion falls short of a thoroughgoing account. We do, however, identify those issues which the value-sensitivity proviso must address. And in Section III below, we argue that two important goods (medical care and advanced education) are DIGs, thus providing an illustration of what is involved in addressing nonfungibility and threshold factors for at least these goods. There is, then, some justice in characterizing both Fishkin’s principle of nontyranny and the value-sensitivity proviso not as principles of distributive justice, but rather as guidelines for generating principles that respectively (1) identify unjust distributions arising from severe deprivations and (2) provide for the distribution of DIGs in response to nonfungibility and threshold factors.
- 15.
 Of course we do not wish to imply that there is no qualitative distinction to be drawn. There are clearly grounds for saying that some procedures are of more value than other procedures undertaken with similar objectives. But a fractional increment of any procedure would be part of that procedure, and hence of no value.
- 16.
Gregg Franzwa deserves credit for this term.
- 17.
Of course, allotments above a certain level might cause harm to a recipient, as in administering too much Sodium Pentothal to a patient undergoing general anesthesia, and trace amounts of a pollutant such as carbon monoxide might produce no negative effect, but large amounts are fatal.
- 18.
We concede that for some “recreational” procedures, a need which is not related to illness could be argued. Models and actors could claim a need for plastic surgery based on employment opportunities.
- 19.
The category of preventive care is also more complex than Williams appears to allow. If it can be assumed that administering tests, vaccinations, and other such “preventive measures” improves one’s prospects for health and longevity, then such items would increase their recipient’s well-being. The “probability factor” is not a problem—all medical care is arguably only probabilistically related to well-being. One could contend that, ceteris paribus, Âotherwise healthy individuals need such items (in terms of preventing ill health) to by and large the same degree. But then Williams’ claim entails an egalitarian criterion for distributing preventive care, based on equal need.
- 20.
Even if limited to therapeutic care, it is not clear that it is a necessary truth that need is the proper criterion of distribution. For one thing, it is a purely contingent matter that therapeutic care of any particular sort is causally related to well-being. Perhaps it is necessary for something’s being an instance of therapeutic care that it increases the well-being of its recipients. Even so, suppose that all therapeutic care could be effectively self-administered and did not require skills possessed by few and materials which are frequently scarce, expensive, and not readily available to nonprofessionals. It would no longer be clear that need is the proper criterion for distribution. Williams’ claim would be more plausible if couched in terms of a “natural necessity” on the model of H. L. A. Hart’s treatment of the “minimum content of natural law” (Hart 1961, pp. 189–94). This would avoid complications associated with necessary truths by restricting the claim to those situations in which humans and the world they live in retain the salient characteristics which they actually have.
- 21.
For a critique of Walzer’s “conventionalism” see Fishkin 1984.
- 22.
We should note that Scanlon himself does not opt for subjective criteria.
- 23.
Thus, preference-based utilitarianism may not qualify as a structural principle since “positions” cannot be specified anonymously as all questions of value reduce to individual tastes and preferences.
- 24.
Here is a brief demonstration of these distinct logical properties.
Where G is a good, P is a potential recipient, and q a quantity, level of allocation, or allotment of G:
G is fungible just in case for each P there is some allocation q of G such that allocating q of G to P will increase P’s well-being over being allotted no G at all.
G is nonfungible just in case G possesses some characteristic C (not possessed by all goods) and some (but not all) P possess some complementary characteristic C’ such that: (i) for any P lacking C’, there is no allocation q of G which will increase P’s well-being over being allocated no G at all, and (ii) for any P possessing C’, there is at least one allocation q of G which will increase P’s well-being over being allocated no G at all.
G is divisible just in case if G is of value to P, any allocation q of G will increase P’s well-being over being allocated no G at all.
G is indivisible just in case if G is of value to P, there is an allocation q of G such that: (i) allocating q of G to P will increase P’s well-being over being allotted no G at all, and (ii) allocating less than q of G to P will not increase P’s well-being over being allotted no G at all, although (iii) q may vary from person to person and across time for individuals.
- 25.
See Hume (1975), pp. 494–95.
- 26.
Rae et al. (1981) offer some interesting guidance as to the variety of options such an approach might encompass in practice.
- 27.
The value-sensitivity proviso could be seen as positing a hierarchy of sorts but only in the limited sense of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate claims with respect to particular (especially scarce) goods.
- 28.
This distinction between affirming values and ranking them bears similarities to Rawls’ (1971) distinction between “thin” and “thicker” descriptions of the good. Also, a theory such as Maslow’s (1970, pp. 35–47), while not strictly speaking a value theory, also offers a basis for ranking values. But from the perspective of the distributional concerns of either structural principles or the value-sensitivity proviso, this too is an exogenous source.
- 29.
See note 3.
- 30.
In actual practice, societies are frequently hesitant about applying abstract structural principles of distributive justice. Even when the good to be allocated is, like currency, a CUG, societies may choose to utilize principles that assign goods to persons rather than distributing them to societal positions. See Hochschild (1981). Criteria that assign goods to individuals on the basis of personal characteristics are better able to address concerns such as the consequences for work incentives. Thus, in contrast to a guaranteed annual income policy (a practical application of the structural maximin principle), a criterion such as effort can handle questions of assignment so that currency is distributed to persons who have previously exerted effort in the paid-labor market—and so earned public policy benefits—as is at least loosely the case with social security pensions.
- 31.
See Wildavsky (1979), especially pp. 41–61.
- 32.
For a relatively early example, see the experience of a Seattle kidney dialysis center as related in Childress (1970).
- 33.
See the New York Times, May 3, 1990, p. AI and May 6, 1990, p. 131.
- 34.
See Starr (1982), Derthick (1979, Chaps. 15 and 16), and Chapman and Talmadge (1971).
- 35.
See Marmor (1970).
- 36.
So in actuality, Medicare distributes currency (a CUG) to pay for medical service rather than the services (DIGs) themselves. This is unquestionably a sensible choice politically. However, this “monetization” of medical care, whether accomplished by private employment-related group insurance or public policy (Medicare), does not, as we show shortly, eliminate some distressing effects of DIGs for distributive justice concerns. These effects are inherent consequences of indivisible goods whose nature and extent lie not only beyond the control of public officials but beyond the control of medical researchers and practitioners as well.
- 37.
- 38.
The more recent COLAs, tied to economic indicators at least partially beyond the control of public officials, share some of the problems of medical care services with respect to cost containment although not to the same degree. But this is not a necessary feature of the CUG involved (currency) and could be changed by political action.
- 39.
- 40.
- 41.
This was especially troublesome in the case of student places in prestigious schools. These student slots are inherently limited “positional” goods. See Hirsch (1976). The supply of these goods cannot be increased sharply without seriously diluting their value.
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Galvin, R.F., Lockhart, C. (2012). Limitations on Structural Principles of Distributive Justice: The Case of Discrete Idiosyncratic Goods. In: Törnblom, K., Kazemi, A. (eds) Handbook of Social Resource Theory. Critical Issues in Social Justice. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4175-5_22
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