Efficiency, Equity, and Corporate Responsibility in Imperfect Competition

  • Victor J. Tremblay
  • Carol Horton Tremblay
Part of the Springer Texts in Business and Economics book series (STBE)


A crucial objective in industrial organization is to evaluate whether or not imperfectly competitive markets perform well from society’s perspective. As we discussed in  Chap. 1, we focus on three dimensions of market performance: static efficiency, dynamic efficiency, and equity. Up to this point, we have spent most of our time discussing efficiency issues. We now begin this chapter with a review and assessment of what we have learned regarding imperfect competition and different types of inefficiency—market power (i.e., allocative inefficiency), X-inefficiency, rent-seeking behavior, and technological change (i.e., dynamic efficiency).


Technological Change Market Power Gini Coefficient Distributive Justice Corporate Responsibility 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Victor J. Tremblay
    • 1
  • Carol Horton Tremblay
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsOregon State UniversityCorvallisUSA

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