Abstract
Spacepower theory is useful in describing, explaining, and predicting how individuals, groups, and states can best derive utility, balance investments, and reduce risks in their interactions with the cosmos. Spacepower theory should be more fully developed and become a source for critical insights as humanity wrestles with our most difficult and fundamental space challenges and guide us toward better ways to generate wealth in space, make tradeoffs between space investments and other important goals, reorder terrestrial security dynamics as space becomes increasingly militarized and potentially weaponized, and seize exploration and survival opportunities that only space can provide. This chapter briefly reviews noteworthy efforts to develop spacepower theory and then considers ways it could help to refine current US space policy and address some of the most significant challenges and issues surrounding space security, space commercialization, and environmental sustainability and survival.
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Notes
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Section 913 of the Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110–417) directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence to submit a Space Posture Review to Congress by 1 December 2009. The Obama Administration delivered an interim SPR to Congress in March 2010 and completed this tasking with release of the NSSS on 4 February 2011.
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“Fengyun 1-C Debris: Two Years Later,” Orbital Debris Quarterly News, Johnson Spaceflight Center: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 2009): 2. As a result of the 11 January 2007 Chinese ASAT test, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network has catalogued 2,378 pieces of debris with diameters greater than 5 cm, is tracking 400 additional debris objects that are not yet catalogued, and estimates the test created more than 150,000 pieces of debris larger than 1 cm2. Unfortunately, less than 2 percent of this debris has reentered the atmosphere so far and it is estimated that many pieces will remain in orbit for decades and some for more than a century.
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SSA issues are framed by specialized concepts and jargon. Conjunctions are close approaches, or potential collisions, between objects in orbit. Propagators are complex modeling tools used to predict the future location of orbital objects. Satellite operators currently use a number of different propagators and have different standards for evaluating and potentially maneuvering away from conjunctions. Maneuvering requires fuel and shortens the operational life of satellites. Orbital paths are described by a set of variables known as ephemeris data; two-line element sets (TLEs) are the most commonly used ephemeris data. Much of this data is contained in the form of a satellite catalog. The United States maintains a public catalog at space-track.org. Other entities maintain their own catalogs. Orbital paths constantly change, or are perturbed, by a number a factors including Earth’s inconsistent gravity gradient, solar activity, and the gravitational pull of other orbital objects. Perturbations cause propagation of orbital paths to become increasingly inaccurate over time; beyond approximately 4 days into the future predictions about the location of orbital objects can be significantly inaccurate. For more about SSA concepts see Weeden (2009). For discussion about ways to share SSA data and other space security ideas fostered by meetings between the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space and the Chief Executive Officers of commercial satellite operators see McGlade (2007).
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For an outstanding and detailed analysis of the benefits and challenges related to creation of an international data center see Cox (2007).
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On the role of militaries in enforcing legal norms and analogies between the law of the sea and space law, see DeSutter (2006).
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Reaching Critical Will, “Preventing the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space: A Backgrounder on the draft treaty by Russia and China.”
- 8.
Although Art VII of the OST discusses liability, that article was further implemented in the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, commonly referred to as the Liability Convention. Under the Liability Convention, Article II, a launching state is absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight. However, under Articles III and IV, in the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth by a space object, the launching state is liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible (i.e., commercial companies), under a negligence standard. The challenge is how best to evolve the existing space law regime with its two-tiered liability system based on either absolute liability or fault/negligence, depending upon the location of the incident, into a structure that might provide more incentives for commercial development of space. The formal citation for the Liability Convention is: Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (resolution 2777 (XXVI) annex) — adopted on 29 November 1971, opened for signature on 29 March 1972, entered into force on 1 September 1972.
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The January 1995 failure was a Long March 2E rocket carrying Hughes-built Apstar 2 spacecraft and the February 1996 failure was a Long March 3B rocket carrying Space Systems/Loral-built Intelsat 708 spacecraft. Representative Christopher Cox (R.-California) led a 6-month long House Select Committee investigation that produced the “U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China” Report released on 25 May 1999. The report is available from http://www.house.gov/coxreport. In January of 2002, Loral agreed to pay the U.S. government $20 million to settle the charges of the illegal technology transfer and in March of 2003, Boeing agreed to pay $32 million for the role of Hughes (which Boeing acquired in 2000). Requirements for transferring controls back to State are in Sections 1513 and 1516 of the Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense Authorization Act. Related items are defined as “satellite fuel, ground support equipment, test equipment, payload adapter or interface hardware, replacement parts, and non-embedded solid propellant orbit transfer engines.”
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Hays, P.L. (2015). Spacepower Theory. In: Schrogl, KU., Hays, P., Robinson, J., Moura, D., Giannopapa, C. (eds) Handbook of Space Security. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-2029-3_52
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