Abstract
The model presented in Chap. 2 assumed that there is only one type of woman and one type of man. This chapter expands the analysis to multiple WiHo (Work-In-Household) markets, assuming that (1) there are many types of both men and women, differing in skills, physical appearance, education, ethnicity, religion, age, etc.; (2) men can easily substitute among women of different types and women can easily substitute among men of different types; and (3) there are competitive markets for each type. The major implications are that own positive traits of WiHo-suppliers will be associated with higher market prices for WiHo and that compensating differentials are expected to be observed: positive traits of WiHo-users will be associated with lower prices for WiHo. Such differences in WiHo prices then have implications for labor supply (Chaps. 5 to 8), time devoted to household chores (Chap. 9), consumption (Chap. 10) and savings (Chap. 11).
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Notes
- 1.
At the time Becker published his theory of marriage, the term “hedonic markets” had not yet been introduced by Sherwin Rosen (Rosen 1974). Since then Rao (1993) and Choo and Siow (2006) have used the term “hedonic” to describe multiple marriage markets of the kind found in Becker’s second demand and supply model.
- 2.
- 3.
The model can also be applied to same-sex marriages. For example, one of the j types could be someone of the same sex.
- 4.
There are parallels between the second step in this analysis and the first stage in models of household distribution with sharing rules: sharing rules are determined by some of the same factors that determine market prices of WiHo.
- 5.
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Grossbard, S. (2015). A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labor and Marriage: Multiple Markets for Work-In-Household. In: The Marriage Motive: A Price Theory of Marriage. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1623-4_3
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