Abstract
One of the philosophical virtues of realism is that it is theoretically neutral. Other philosophical “paradigms” do not share this virtue. The methodological prescriptions of the behaviorist deny the legitimacy of psychological explanations. The doctrines of scientific psychology deny the legitimacy of agency explanations, via the commitment to the Humean account of causality. The doctrines of hermeneutical psychology deny the legitimacy of explanations of human action in terms of ontologically sufficient conditions.
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© 1989 Springer-Verlag New York Inc.
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Greenwood, J.D. (1989). Explanation, Prediction, and Control. In: Explanation and Experiment in Social Psychological Science. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-8801-2_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-8801-2_10
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
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