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Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited

  • Oliver E. Williamson
Chapter
Part of the Nijenrode Studies in Economics book series (NIEC, volume 2)

Abstract

The merger of two firms is commonly viewed from an antitrust standpoint in terms of its anticompetitive effects on price. Sometimes, however, a merger will also result in real increases in efficiency which reduce the average cost of production of the combined entity below that of the two merging firms. The neglect, suppression, or even perverse interpretation of such economies was characteristic of antitrust enforcement in the early sixties and beyond. There are recent indications, however, that economies are now being valued more positively.

Keywords

Supra Note Allocative Efficiency Deadweight Loss Horizontal Merger Antitrust Policy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© H. E. Stenfert Kroese B.V. 1977

Authors and Affiliations

  • Oliver E. Williamson

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