Abstract
In the theory of social systems, problems of time have been dealt with up till now mainly from the viewpoint of stability. Time is thereby understood as a duration, measurable by clocks, in which the maintenance of the system can become a problem. Maintenance is only possible, in a complex and fluctuating environment, when the system itself becomes dynamic. It should facilitate its own processes, which lead to different outcomes depending on the environmental situation, and it should also be able to change its own structures to some extent in order to adapt to changing environmental conditions. In this respect, flexibility of structures can be functionally equivalent to change, i.e. it may make change unnecessary to some degree.
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Notes
See Talcott Parsons, ‘Some Considerations on the Theory of Social Change.’ Rural Sociology 26, 219–239, 1961.
See Talcott Parsons, ‘Some Problems of a General Theory in Sociology.’ pp. 27–68 (29 ff.) in Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Developments (John C. McKinney and Edward A. Tiryakian (eds.)), New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970.
Compare the ‘General Statement’, pp. 3-29 (16) in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1951.
Emile Durkheim, De la Division du Travail Social (reprint of the 2nd edition), pp. 177ff.; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973.
The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago/London: Open Court, 1932.
Compare J. Ellis McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time.’ Mind 17 (1908), reprinted (pp. 457-474) in his Philosophical Studies, London, 1934; and also, of course, countless social-scientific and humanistic defense reactions against this merely chronometrical conception of time.
Compare Niklas Luhmann, ‘Komplexität.’ pp. 204–220 in his Soziologische Aufklärung Vol. 2, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975.
See also, in this respect, pp. 147ff. and 292ff. in Jürgen Habermas/ Niklas Luhmann: Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie: Was leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971.
This problem has now and then been taken up also in social-scientific contexts, but it has never been considered sufficiently in its theoretical relevance. Compare V. A. Graicunas, ‘Relationship in Organization.’ pp. 181–187 in Luther Gulick/ Lyndall Urwick, (eds.) Papers on the Science of Administration, New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937. And also: James H. S. Bossard, ‘The law of Family Interaction.’ American Journal of Sociology 50, 292-294, 1945; William M. Kephart, ‘A Quantitative Analysis of Intragroup Relationships.’ American Journal of Sociology 55, 544-549, 1950; Fremont A. Shull, Jr./André L. Delbecq/L. L. Cummings, Organizational Decision Making, New York: McGraw Hill, pp. 145ff., 1970.
Compare W. Ross Ashby, Design for a Brain (2nd edition), London: Chapman and Hall, 1954.
Compare, for example, J. W. S. Pringle, ‘On the Parallel between Learning and Evolution.’ Behaviour 3, 174–215 (184ff.) 1951; Andrew S. McFarland, Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems, Stanford, Cal.: Stanford U.P., p. 16; 1969. Compare further, for the concept of sequential complexity, J. E. Hopcroft, ‘An Overview of the Theory of Computational Complexity.’ Journal ofthe Association for Computing Machinery 18, 444-475, 1971; Hannu Nurmi, ‘On the Concept of Complexity and its Relationship to the Methodology of Policy-oriented Research.’ Social Science Information 13, 55-80, 1974.
One of the points of difference, that will not be gone into any further here, seems to be that a theory of complexity with overly simplistic premises switches prematurely to epistemological, cognitive, simulation-technical problems. Object structures are then dealt with as difficulties in knowledge acquisition or as simulation problems. The complexity of the object then does not anymore become a problem with what it means/or itself, it merely still appears as a hindrance for the investigation of the object.
Compare the reference of H. Hubert, ‘Etude Sommaire de la Représentation du Temps dans la Religion et la Magie.’ pp. 189–229 (202ff.) in H. Hubert/M. Mauss, Mélanges d’Histoire des Religions, Paris, 1909, to the effect that societies without time measurement tend to identify time periods with those events which they introduce or conclude.
To that extent one may say, with Koselleck, that structures presuppose a different time than events, since they are not identifiable with respect to a clearcut before and after, but only with respect to the fact that something changes in the course of their duration. Compare Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Darstellung, Ereignis und Struktur.’ pp. 307–317 in Gerhard Schulz (ed.) Geschichte Heute: Positionen, Tendenzen, Probleme, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1973.
Compare, for example, Robert Axelrod, ‘Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition.’ American Political Science Review 67, 1248–1266, 1973.
Compare Friedrich Jonas, ‘Zur Aufgabenstellung der modernen Soziologie.’ Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie 52, 349–375, 1966; Alan Dawe, ‘The Two Sociologies.’ British Journal of Sociology 21, 207-218, 1970. In the meantime a customary component of ‘theoretical comparisons.’
This is the fundamental insight of the Parsonian theory of the general system of action, from which then admittedly different conclusions are drawn than in the following.
This, however, is done by Klaus Grimm: Niklas Luhmann’s’ soziologische Aufklärung’ oder das Elend der aprioristischen Soziologie, Hamburg: Haffmann und Campe, 1974.
It is generally accepted that only the actor can constitute the unity of an action. See, for example, Werner Langenheder, Theorie menschlicher Entscheidungshandlungen, Stuttgart: Enke, pp. 42ff., 1975.
This pronouncement, that meaning finds its unity in making different possibilities of experiencing and action accessible, could also be confirmed, referring to Husserl, by phenomenological analyses. See Niklas Luhmann, ‘Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie.’ pp. 25–100, in Habermas/Luhmann, op cit.
To that extent I follow Alfred Schütz in the thesis that actions can only be represented as finished actions, and future actions only as ‘pre-remembered’, only modo futuri exacti. Compare pp. 55ff. in his Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Sociologie, Vienna: Springer, 1932. Action can only be represented as finished, but then has to be represented as contingent, because one identifies it with regard to temporal horizons of change.
See esp. George H. Mead, op. cit.
See Niklas Luhmann, ‘Weltzeit und Systemgeschichte.’ in his Soziologische Aufklärung, Vol. 2, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975, pp. 103–133; ‘The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal Structures in Modern Society.’ Social Research 43, 130-152, 1976; Otthein Rammstedt, ‘Alltagsbewusztsein von Zeit.’ Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 27, 47-63, 1975
Compare Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, New York: McGraw Hill, pp. 43ff., 1937.
Compare, e.g. the proceedings: Social Process: Papers presented at the 26th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington, Dec. 28-31, 1932; Chicago, 1933. See also Alvin Boskoff, ‘Process-Orientation in Sociological Theory and Research: Untasted Old Wine in Slightly Used Bottles.’ Social Forces 50, 1-12, 1971; and Evon Z. Vogt, ‘On the Principles of Structure and Process in Cultural Anthropology. American Anthropologist 62, 18-33, 1960.
Compare, however, remarkable exhortations by Paul Ridder, ‘Bewegung sozialer Systeme: Über die endogene Erzeugung von Veränderungen.’ Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 26, 1–28,1974; id., ‘Messung sozialer Prozesse.’ Soziale Welt 27, 144-161, 1976.
Consequently, within processes events have a similar function for each other as structures have for processes: limitation of the possible, giving purpose, lightening decisional burdens.
Compare, e.g. Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, New York: Free Press, 1963.
See J. W. S. Pringle, op. cit., p. 184.
Compare Jacques Necker, De l’Importance des Opinions Religieuses. London/Lyon, 1788, cited from: Oevres Complètes, Paris, 1821, reprint Vol. 12, pp. 55ff.
Compare, e.g. Essais II, XII (Pléiade edition, Paris, 1951, pp. 679ff.): ‘Finalement, il n’y a aucune constante existence, ny de nostre estre, ny de celuy des objects. Et nous, et nostre jugement, et toutes choses mortelles, vont coulant et roulant sans cesse. Ainsi il ne se peut establir rien de certain de l’un à l’autre, et le jugeant et le jugé estans en continuelle mutation et branle.… Ainsin estant toutes choses subjectes à passer d’un changement en autre, la raison, y cherchant une réele subsistence, se trouve déçuee, ne puvant rien appréhender de subsistant et permanent, par ce que tout ou vient en estre et n’est pas encore du tout, ou commence à mourir avant qu’il soit nay’.
Compare Georges Poulet, Études sur le Temps Humaine. Paris, Plon., 1950; id., ‘Fénélon et le Temps.’ La Nouvelle Revue Française, pp. 624-644, 1954.
‘Que nous devons principalement avoir en veue d’obéir à Dieu dans le moment présent’, demands Pierre Nicole, Essais de Morale, Vol. 1 (6th edition). Paris: Desprez, p. 117, 1682, and that is for him at the same time the most effective elimination of every self-interest. Compare also the exact synchronization of religious activities and miditations with the course of the day in Thomas Gouge, Christian Directions, Showing how to Walk with God All the Day long. London, 1690—demands that were, in this exalted form, drawn up only for a life specially reserved for this, a monastic way of life.
Important contributions in this respect, and for the total context of this self-maintenance semantics, in H. Ebeling (ed.): Subjektivität und Selbsterhaltung: Beiträge zur Diagnose der Moderne, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976.
See Dieter Henrich, ‘Die Grundstruktur der modernen Philosophie.’ in Ebeling, op. cit., pp. 97-143.
Compare, in this respect, the Programm des Lexikons Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Otto Brunner/Werner Conze/Reinhart Koselleck, eds.) in Vol. 1, Stuttgart 1972, Klett, pp. XIII-XXVII. As theory apurely historical premise functions here: that nearly all essential concepts of the old-European tradition have basically changed since the middle of the eighteenth century, and that temporalization was an essential characteristic of this transformation, next to democratization, politicization, and ideologization. Compare also Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard U.P., pp. 242ff., 1936, reprinted 1950; Margaret T. Hodgen, Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 433ff., 1964; François Jacob, La Logique du Vivant: Une Histoire de l’Hérédité, Paris: Gallimard, 1970: Reinhart Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft der frühen Neuzeit, Festgabe Carl Schmitt, Berlin: Duncke und Humboldt, pp. 551-566, 1968; Reinhardt Koselleck: ‘Neuzeit’: Zur Semantik moderner Bewegungsbegriff, in: Studien zum Beginn der modernen Welt. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 264-299, 1977; Wolf Lepenies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte, München: Hanser, 1976. In all these and many other works, temporalization is analyzed well and in many ways, but nevertheless only brought to the fore as a fact, albeit an all-pervading historical overall fact. The formula ‘temporalization of complexity’ should offer starting points as to how to transcend this theoretically.
Compare Niklas Luhmann, ‘Differentiation of Society.’ Canadian Journal of Sociology 2, 29–53, 1977.
Compare Jacques LeGoff, ‘Temps de l’Eglise et Temps du Marchand.’ Annales E.S. C. 15, 417–433, 1960.
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Luhmann, N. (1978). Temporalization of complexity. In: Geyer, R.F., van der Zouwen, J. (eds) Sociocybernetics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-4097-3_7
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