A Structural Framework for Conceptualizing Ethical Issues in Behavioral-Ecological Practice

Abstract

It is an inevitable aspect of the human condition that we are intermittently faced with deciding what we ought to do. Ethical “problems” are matters of “correct” behavior, no easy thing to define. Perhaps unfortunately, ethical judgments cannot be made with scientifically precise or consistent criteria. Indeed, such judgments about what is right and what is wrong, what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, when punishment is warranted and when it is not—such judgments are, for most of us, relative rather than absolute and invariant. Different people do not necessarily arrive at the same conclusions even when they have the same data. The differences are heightened when the people viewing the same event or situation do not share the same percepts, assumptions, and values: Collisions of this sort are often passionate. Moreover, our judgments may manifest a “rubber yardstick,” for we often apply standards somewhat more loosely to our own actions than to those of others, and make allowances for the actions of some people or some groups that we are unwilling to make for others.