Abstract
I can discover only one point of agreement between myself and Professor Paul Ramsey. Of course it is true that, as a matter of history, belief in the unconditional requirements of morality was originally rooted in a religious view of the world—provided, for example, we recognize Sophocles as a religious writer, just as much as the author of Deuteronomy. But Ramsey’s contention that belief in morality’s unconditional demands requires (both for logical warrant and that it may have practical effect) some kind of theological belief is much less precise than Kant’s. Ramsey says (p. 161) “that the ultimate warrant for moral norms must be an appeal to what the Lord of heaven and earth is believed to have been doing and to be doing in enacting and establishing his covenant with us and with all mankind….” A little earlier he puts the word “premises” into quotes, thus casting some doubt on what exactly he means by using the word “warrant.” Either, I take it, the beliefs that he cites function as premises in an argument, thus providing a putative warrant, or they do not.
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© 1981 The Hastings Center
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MacIntyre, A. (1981). A Rejoinder to a Rejoinder. In: Callahan, D., Engelhardt, H.T. (eds) The Roots of Ethics. The Hastings Center Series in Ethics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-3303-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-3303-6_8
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