MBFR: Problems and Lessons

  • Reinhard Mutz


Three hundred years ago the armies of eastern and western Europe confronted each other before the walls of Vienna to decide fate of the continent. Today diplomats from East and West are facing each other within the walls of Vienna to decide on measures to reduce and control armed forces in Europe. A decisive battle must be avoided. This would seem to suggest progress in the nature of political relations among nations and governments. But wait. The Viennese celebrated this year’s 300th anniversary of the liberation of their city from Kiuprili Vizier Kara Mustafa’s siege with a week-long festival. No one, however, celebrated a short time later the occasion of the Vienna disarmament conference’s tenth anniversary. There was nothing to celebrate.


Federal Republic Military Expenditure Force Reduction European Security Eastern Block 
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  1. 1.
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    The best comprehensive description of the development and evolution of the negotiations is:John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions - The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe, New York n.d. (1980).Google Scholar
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    Academic works from American and German universities and submitted in the form of typescripts are a major source for political analyses of particular aspects of the negotiations. Among them are:Jane M.O. Sharp, “MBFR as Arms Control?” Harvard University, 1976;Google Scholar
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    See:Keliher, op. cit, pp. 158–161. Keliher was also a member of the American MBFR delegation in Vienna for a while.Google Scholar
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    This refers to the so-called “Rogers Plan” of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Similar in orientation and argumentation is:Robert R. Bowie et al.,“Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe — Report on the European Security Study (ESECS),” London and Basingstoke, 1983.Google Scholar
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    The relationship between potential American troop withdrawals and the Vienna negotiations has already been the subject of Congressional hearings, See:“NATO Troop Withdrawals,” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, November 30, 1982, Washington, 1982.Google Scholar
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    John Borawski,“MBFR,” in:National Defense, No. 383, 1982, p. 14.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • Reinhard Mutz
    • 1
  1. 1.Free University of BerlinGermany

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