Proposals and Technology for Arms Control Verification — A Survey

  • F. Ronald Cleminson
  • Ernest Gilman


No other single issue in the decade of the 1980’s is likely to be of greater significance in the process of international arms control and disarmament than verification. Particularly with the erosion of detente and the resultant increasing uncertainty in international relations, nations are unlikely to accede to treaties affecting their own national security without adequate means of assurance that other signatories will in fact be lining up to the terms of the agreement.


Verification System Verification Method Chemical Weapon Seismic Sensor Cruise Missile 
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  1. 1.
    A. Crawford, F.R. Cleminson, D.A. Grant and E. Gilman, Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals (Second Edition), ORAE Report No. R81, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Canada, March 1982 - also CD/275, April 1982.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    A. Crawford and E. Gilman, Quantitative Overview of the Second Edition of the Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals, ORAE Report No. R89, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Canada, April 1983 - an earlier similar study is CD/127, June 1980.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    F.R. Cleminson and E. Gilman, A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification, ORAE Report No. R19, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Canada, August 1981 - also CD/183, June 1981 and both editions are in French. This paper is the basis for the present essay.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Barry R. Schneider, “Verify”, Across the board, 20: 4 (April 1983) 21.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Stuart A. Cohen, “SALT Verification: The Evolution of Soviet Views and Their Meanings for the Future”, Orbis, 24:3 (Fall 1980), 674–676.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    For example, see, Edward Jay Epstein, “Disinformation: Or, Why the CIA CANNOT Verify an Arms - Control Agreement”, Commentary, 74:1 (July 1982), 21 – 28.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Schneider, 21.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Field Operations Division, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau, Summary Report of Field Test F-15, Exercise First Look: Inspection and Observation of Retained Levels of Ground_and General Purpose Air Forces in Specific Area (UK), February 970. Also see ORAE Report No. R81, March 1982, Compendium, by A. Crawford et al., pp. 5–9.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Aviation Week and Space Technology, 23 August 1976, 40–42 and ORAE Report No. 81, pp. 16–19.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Epstein, 21.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    “An Interview with Eugene V. Rostow,” National Defence, 66: 377 (April 1982), 68.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    “Verification: No Obstacle to Arms Control,” Arms Control Today, 13:5 (June 1983), particularly “Cooperative Verification” by Karl Pieragostini.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    P.E. Trudeau, Transcript of Remarks at the Convocation Ceremony at Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, May 16, 1982.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • F. Ronald Cleminson
    • 1
    • 2
  • Ernest Gilman
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of External AffairsArms Control and Disarmament DivisionOttawaCanada
  2. 2.Department of National DefenceOperational Research and Analysis EstablishmentOttawaCanada

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