Barter in Coalitionally Structured Economies

  • Robert P. Gilles
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 12)


In previous chapters we have discussed in detail the properties of Edgeworthian barter processes in finite exchange systems. The main convergence results under the hypothesis of sovereignty of the economic agents, such as the Debreu-Scarf and the Vind-Anderson theorems, show that one may expect that in an exchange system with infinitely many sovereign agents the Edgeworthian barter processes lead to Walrasian equilibrium allocations only.


Exchange System Economic Agent Equivalence Theorem Walrasian Equilibrium Core Allocation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert P. Gilles
    • 1
  1. 1.Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State UniversityBlacksburgUSA

Personalised recommendations