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Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLC,volume 20))

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Abstract

In this paper, we shall follow the implications of the following pair of principles.

  1. (i)

    The state space should be construed as the set of all maximally specific descriptions of the world, including a complete specification of the knowledge (and ignorance) of all individuals.

  2. (ii)

    An individual has exactly the reasoning ability of some computing machine.

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© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Shin, H.S., Williamson, T. (1997). Representing the Knowledge of Turing Machines. In: Bacharach, M., Gérard-Varet, LA., Mongin, P., Shin, H.S. (eds) Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Theory and Decision Library, vol 20. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-1139-3_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-1139-3_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-4804-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4613-1139-3

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