Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games

  • G. Bonanno
  • P. Battigalli
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 20)


The language of extensive games is complex and rich. It allows one to express such notions as the order of moves, the information a player has when it is her turn to move, etc. It is not, however, a sufficiently rich language in the sense that there are meaningful and natural statements that one can make (about a given extensive game) whose truth cannot be decided without making the language richer. We shall give two examples. Consider first the extensive form of Figure 1.


Common Knowledge Terminal Node Extensive Form Maximum Information Strategy Profile 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

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  • G. Bonanno
  • P. Battigalli

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