The Constitution as Interpretant Sign
Because of the wealth of his contributions to American law and to the shaping of the United States Constitution, and because of his principal role in interpreting Peirce’s pragmatism and semiotic theory and method into what has developed as the most revolutionary movement in modern law, namely, legal realism and its congeners, the thought of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes should be examined more closely than is possible within the scope of this book. The writings about Holmes, from the viewpoints of jurisprudence, social philosophy, and legal philosophy, are voluminous, raising questions far beyond those addressed in this introduction to legal semiotics; they warrant a separate study on Holmes, which is in preparation.
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- 1.See Moore (1979:238–268, especially 239, 240).Google Scholar
- 2.See also Parker (1979:269–295).Google Scholar
- 3.Ibid., 260.Google Scholar
- 4.Ibid., 272, 273.Google Scholar
- 5.Ibid.Google Scholar
- 6.Peirce (1967:302, 303, L75).Google Scholar
- 7.See McCloskey (1962:34–46); also Wright (1938).Google Scholar
- 9.See Hayek (1973:115).Google Scholar
- 10.Ibid., 121.Google Scholar
- 11.Ibid., 141 ff.Google Scholar
- 12.See Friedman (1962:219–243).Google Scholar
- 13.Ibid., 219.Google Scholar