Abstract
It is not easy to sit in an ivory tower and think of ways to help solve the world’s environmental problems. As one who frequently engages in this exercise, I can attest to this fact. One of the dangers with ivory tower theorizing is that it is easy to lose sight of the actual problems that need to be solved, and the range of potential solutions. In my view, this loss of sight has become increasingly evident in the theoretical structure underlying environmental economics, which often emphasizes elegance at the expense of realism.
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Hahn, R.W. (1989). Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: Not Exactly What the Doctor Ordered. In: Shogren, J.F. (eds) The Political Economy of Government Regulation. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 4. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0871-3_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0871-3_6
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