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Bootleggers and Baptists in the Market for Regulation

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The Political Economy of Government Regulation

Part of the book series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series ((TREP,volume 4))

Abstract

Regulation of individual behavior by higher authorities is as ancient as the Garden of Eden and as recent as yesterday’s Federal Register. Adam and Eve chaffed against the iron-clad specification standard they confronted, accepted the advice of an independent counselor, engaged in noncompliance activities, and suffered the consequences. They were required to leave a pristine environment where entry was barred and move to a significantly deteriorated competitive location where labor productivity was lower and future regulations would be crafted by their fellow man.

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Yandle, B. (1989). Bootleggers and Baptists in the Market for Regulation. In: Shogren, J.F. (eds) The Political Economy of Government Regulation. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 4. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0871-3_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0871-3_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-8212-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4613-0871-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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