Bootleggers and Baptists in the Market for Regulation

  • Bruce Yandle
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series book series (TREP, volume 4)

Abstract

Regulation of individual behavior by higher authorities is as ancient as the Garden of Eden and as recent as yesterday’s Federal Register. Adam and Eve chaffed against the iron-clad specification standard they confronted, accepted the advice of an independent counselor, engaged in noncompliance activities, and suffered the consequences. They were required to leave a pristine environment where entry was barred and move to a significantly deteriorated competitive location where labor productivity was lower and future regulations would be crafted by their fellow man.

Keywords

Cage Transportation Mold Income Flammability 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruce Yandle

There are no affiliations available

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