Abstract
Few sets of tea leaves are examined, analyzed, and pored over as closely as any United States Supreme Court decision involving what is generically known as a Miranda issue.1 The scholarly and popular debates that have raged since a badly fractured Warren Court attempted to establish a “bright line” test for admissibility of confessions in Miranda v Arizona2 have given Miranda a symbolic value that extends far beyond the decision’s actual impact on police interrogation.3 Although the Burger (and now the Rehnquist) Courts have expressed dissatisfaction with the constitutional and philosophical underpinnings of the doctrine, the “inescapably political overtones” of an outright reversal4 make it likely that Miranda will not be overruled “at this late date.”5 Even though the doctrine—by the Court’s own reckoning—remains “murky,”6 and its empirical impact remains questionable,7 it remains a “punch-drunk fighter, reeling on the ropes but not yet counted out.”8
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
For a recent sampling, see, e.g., Schulhofer: Reconsidering Miranda. 54 U Chi Law Rev 435 (1987); Bradley: Criminal procedure in the Rehnquist court: Has the Rehnquisi- tion begun? 62 Ind Law Rev 273 (1987); Saltzburg: Miranda v Arizona revisited: Constitutional law or judicial fiat? 26 Washburn Law J 1 (1986); Ogletree: Are confes-sions really good for the soul? A proposal to Mirandize Miranda. 100 Harv Law Rev 1826 (1987). For a stark point-counterpoint debate, compare Caplan: Questioning Miranda. 38 Vand Law Rev 1417 (1985), to White: Defending Miranda: A reply to Professor Caplan. 39 Vand Law Rev 1 (1986).
384 U.S. 436 (1966). As originally articulated, the Miranda rules stipulated:[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from the custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive ef-fectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.Id. at 444–445 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Sonenshein: Miranda and the Burger court: Trends and countertrends.13 Loy U Chi Law J 405, 415 (1982); Israel: Criminal procedure, the Burger court, and the legacy of the Warren court. 75 Mich Law Rev 1319, 1374 (1977) (“Although the value of the Miranda ruling in effectively protecting the suspect’s self-incrimination privilege is debatable, the decision has a symbolic quality that extends far beyond its practical impact upon police interrogation methods”).
See Stone: The Miranda doctrine in the Burger Court. [1977] Sup Ct Rev 99, 169.
Rhode Island v Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (305) (1980) (Burger, CJ, concurring).On the other hand, the doctrine has been significantly reduced in a series of recent cases. See, e.g., New York v Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653–660 (1984); Oregon v Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–314 (1985); Connecticut v Barrett, 107 S. Ct. 828, 831–833 (1987); see generally, Note: Miranda and the state constitution: State courts take a stand. 39 Vand Law Rev 1693, 1714–1717 (1986) (“Vanderbilt Note”); but see, Weisberg: Foreword: Criminal procedure doctrine: Some versions of the skeptical. 76 J Crim Law Criminol 832, 840 (1985), noting the Burger Court decisions reaffirming defendants’ rights in interrogation cases—e.g., Brewer v Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)—that we “tend to forget or deny”.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316.
See, e.g., LaFave, Israel: Criminal Procedure §6.5(c), at 483–484 “Miranda has had little effect upon clearance and conviction rates”. St. Paul, Minn, West’s, 1984.
Perlin ML: The supreme court, the mentally disabled criminal defendant, and sym¬bolic values: Random decisions, hidden rationales, or “Doctrinal abyss”? 29 Ariz Law Rev 1,92 (1987) (“Doctrinal Abyss”).
Compare, e.g., North Carolina v Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (explicit statement not necessary as predicate for Miranda waiver); Quarles, supra (“public safety” exception to Miranda); Elstad, supra (initial failure to administer Miranda warnings does not “taint” subsequent admissions made after warnings properly given); Moran v Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986) (Miranda waiver not vitiated by failure of police to inform defendant that attorney was attempting to contact him); and Colorado v Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987) (mere silence by law enforcement official as to subject matter of interrogation not “trickery” sufficient to invalidate Miranda waiver) with e.g., Edwards v Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (“heavy burden” on state to prove that Miranda waiver—after assertion of rights—was voluntary, intelligent, and knowing); and Shea v Louisiana, 105 S. Ct. 1065 (1985) (applying Edwards retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal).
See, e.g., Estelle v Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (admission of psychiatrist’s testimony at penalty phase of capital punishment case violated defendant’s privilege against self- incrimination where defendant not advised prior to pretrial psychiatric examination of right to remain silent); Miller v Fenton, 106 U.S. 445 (1985) (voluntariness of confession is not issue of fact presumed to be correct in subsequent habeas corpus proceeding; interrogating officer throught defendant had “mental problem”); Wain- Jmight v Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986) (state may not use postarrest, post -Miranda silence as evidence of defendant’s sanity).For a recent attack on Greenfield from a prosecutor’s perspective, see Daley, Fryklund: The insanity defense and the “testimony by proxy” problem. 21 Valparaiso Law Rev 497 (1987).
361 U.S. 199 (1960).
Id. at 207.
367 U.S. 568 (1961).
Id. at 581. See also, e.g., Bram v United States, 168 U.S. 532, 547 (1897) (citing Hale).
See, e.g., Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Brief for Petitioner, at 3 (defendant.diagnosed by court-appointed psychiatrist as schizophrenic); see also, State v Miranda, 401 P.2d 716, 718 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 1965) (request for sanity determination).
372 U.S. 293 (1963).
Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207.
Townsend, 372 U.S. at 307, quoting Reck v Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961), and Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 208.
107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
Parry: Involuntary confessions based on mental impairments. 11 Ment Phys Dis Law Rptr 2 (1987).
See Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 525 (Brennan, J, dissenting).
For the classic survey article on the concept of mental illness in assessing free will in a confessions context, see Grano: Voluntariness, free will, and the law of confessions. 65 VaLaw Rev 859(1979).
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519–522.
Id. at 523–524.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 518.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 518–519.
Id. at 519.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See People v Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 728 (1985).
Id., 106 S. Ct. 785 (1986).
Colorado v Connelly, No. 85–660, Amicus Brief of APA, at 3.
Id.
Neither the American Psychiatric Association nor the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law filed a brief in Connelly.
See, e.g., Mills v Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 292 n.* (1982) (right to refuse treatment); Rivers v Katz, 504 N.Y.S. 2d 74, 76 (Ct. App. 1986) (right to refuse treatment).
See, e.g., Ake v Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 70 n.* (1985) (right to psychiatric assistance in presentation of insanity defense).
See Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 524.
Justice Blackmun concurred in part and in judgment; Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part; Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented.
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520 and id. n. 1, citing, inter alia, Mincey v Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Greenwald v Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968); Beecher v Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967); Culombe, supra.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id., citing United States v Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906–913 (1984). For a recent, thoughtful analysis of the role of the Leon decision in the Supreme Court’s new “major- itarianism” doctrine, see Finer: Gates, Leon, and the compromise of adjudicative fairness: Of aggresive majoritarianism, willful deafness, and the new exception to the exclusionary rule. (Part 2), 34 Cleve St Law Rev 199 (1985).
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521.
Id. at 522.
Id., quoting Lisenba v California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
404 U.S. 477, 488 (1972).
444 U.S. 469 (1980).
441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522–523.
Id. at 523 (italics added).
Id. at 522.
Id. at 522–523, quoting Connelly, 702 P.2d at 729.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523, citing United States v Washington, 431 U.S. 181, (1977).
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523 (italics added).
Id., quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 524 (italics added).
Id. quoting Beckwith v United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 (1976).
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 524.
Id.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 525, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
Connelly,107 S. Ct. at 525.
Id.
See Moran, discussed supra note 9.
Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.
Id.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 525 n.5.
Id. at 525–526.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 527. Here, Justice Brennan relied, in part, on the citation to Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown, see Br am, supra, note 14.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 527, and see also cases cited id. at 527–528 n.2.
Id. at 529 n.3.
Id.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 530–531.
Id. at 531.
Id., quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
See 404 U.S. at 490.
See Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 531–532.
Id. at 532–533, quoting Connelly, 702 P.2d at 729.
See Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 533.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520.
Id. at 521.
See, e.g., Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 200–204 (detailing the defendant’s “lengthy siege” of mental illness); Townsend, 372 U.S. at 299–306 (recounting the physiological and psychological responses of the severely disabled defendant to the state-induced and - ordered injection of a truth serum drug).
106 S. Ct. at 1141.
Id.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 525 n.5 (Stevens, J, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141 (italics added).
See Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 532–533 (Brennan, J, dissenting).
See e.g., Inbau Reid Buckley: Criminal Interrogation and Confessions ed 3 1986, p 57.
See, e.g., Wulach: The assessment of competency to waive Miranda rights. 9 J Psych Law 209 (1981); see also, Fourth circuit review. 41 Wash Lee Law Rev 493, 636–654 (1984) (effect of mental disability on determining voluntariness of juvenile’s confession).
See Metzner: Colorado v Connelly. Confessions of the mentally ill. 12 Newsletter Am Acad Psych Law 4, 7 (April 1987).
See Connelly, Brief of Amicus APA, at 25 (“behavioral science does not use or rely upon the concepts of ‘volition’ or ‘free will’”).
See, e.g., Connelly, Brief of Amicus FREE, at 56–57 n.54 (citing contrary sources, including Stein Contemporary Psychotherapies [1961], and Frank Persuasion and Healing [1973).
See, e.g., McReady v Blue Shield of Virginia, 457 U.S. 465. 478–479 (1982) (discussing alleged conspiracy by state psychiatric association and Blue Shield plan “to halt encroachment by psychologists into a market that physicians and psychiatrists sought to preserve for themselves”).
See, e.g., Estelle, 451 U.S. at 472; Addington v Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979); Vitek v Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980); see also, Ford v Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
Ake, 470 U.S. at 79.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519.
See, e.g., Connelly, Brief of Amicus FREE, at 27–32, and also sources cited id. at nn.21–23; see generally, Kolb Brodie: Modern Clinical Psychiatry at ed 10, 1982, at 126 (“Hallucinations conveying a command are often convincing and compelling. They may lead to direct and dangerous action. Considerations of reality are of little weight in comparison to their influence”); Kaplan Sadock (eds): Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry ed 4 1985, at 574 (hallucinating schizophrenic patients often act on their inner perceptions “as though they were more compelling that the external realities”).
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519.
See, e.g., Michigan v Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 1411 (1986) (Burger, CJ, concurring in judgment), quoting Reik: The Compulsion to Confess 1959.
See Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 524 (Blackmun, J, concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368–372 (1970) (Harlan, J, concurring).
See, e.g., “Vanderbilt Note”, supra note 5, at 1730–1734; Latzer: Limits of the new federalism: State court responses, 14 Search Seizure Law Rep 89 (1987); Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 533 (Brennan, J, dissenting) (“today’s holding does not, of course, preclude a contrary resolution of this case based upon the state’s separate interpretation of its own constitution”).
See, e.g., State v McGonigle, 401 N.W. 2d 39, 41 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1987); People v Rhodes, 729 P. 2d 982, 984–985 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1986).
See, e.g., State v Dailey, 351 S.E. 2d 431, 434 n.2 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1986); State v Vincik, 398 N.W. 2d 788, 792–793 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1987).
See State v Clappes, 401 N.W. 2d 759 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1987); id. at 769 (Heffernan J, concurring); id. at 770 (Abrahamson, J, dissenting).
See, e.g., United States v Phillips, 812 F. 2d 1355 (11 Cir. 1987); United States v Rohrbach, 813 F. 2d 142(8 Cir. 1987); and United States ex rel. Link v Lane, 811 F. 2d 1166 (7 Cir.1987; but see, Biller v Lopes, 655 F. Supp. 292 (D. Conn. 1987) (confession involuntary due to coercion).
Alschuler: Failed pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger court. 100 Haw Law Rev 1436, 1442 (1987).
Compare, e.g., Estelle; Greenfield; Ake; Ford, all supra, with Barefoot v Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Jones v United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Smith v Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2678 (1986); and Allen v Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986); see generally, “Doctrinal Abyss”, supra note 8.
Parry, supra note 20, at 5.
See “Doctrinal Abyss”, supra note 8, at 281.
See Perlin ML: State constitutions and statutes as sources of rights for the mentally disabled: The last frontier? 20 Loyola LA Law Rev 1249, 1264–1266 n.99 (1987).
See, e.g., Frendak v United States, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979); State v Kahn, 417 A.2d 585 (N.J. App. Div. 1980).
The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in Satterwhite v Texas, No. 86–6284, on the question of the adequacy of warnings to be given to a criminal defendant as to the specific purposes of a psychiatric interview.
See, e.g., Perlin ML: After Hinckley: Old myths, new realities and the future of the insanity defense. Directions in Psychiatry, 1985 vol 5, lesson 22.
Metzner, supra note 103, at 7.
See, e.g., Mills, 457 U.S. at 299 (“The parties agree that the Constitution recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding the administration of antipsychotic drugs”); Youngberg v Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (“Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these interests”).
See, e.g., Perlin ML: Ten years after: Evolving mental health advocacy and judicial trends. 15 Ford Urb Law J 335 (1986–87); Perlin ML: Patients’ rights, in 3 Cavenar, (ed): Psychiatry ed rev 1986 ch. 35.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1989 Plenum Press, New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Perlin, M.L. (1989). Criminal Confessions and the Mentally Disabled. In: Rosner, R., Harmon, R.B. (eds) Criminal Court Consultation. Critical Issues in American Psychiatry and the Law, vol 5. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0739-6_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0739-6_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-8058-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-4613-0739-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive