Reconstruction

Abstract

Reconstructionism is a methodology of logical empiricism on according to which in epistemology and philosophy of science “one should not describe the real process of obtaining knowledge in its concrete constitution but rather give a rational reconstruction of its formal structure” (Carnap, see the beginning of [13]). The reconstruction is meant to be a translation of a primary scientific text into a logically impeccable language such that “the new determinations.....are superior to the old ones with respect to clarity and precision” (Carnap, ibid.). In the sixties this methodology came under fire from two sides. From the side of constructive philosophy of science, its advocates were blamed for keeping their reconstructions much too close to the actual procedure of the scientists without ever giving them a critical touch. By contrast, the representatives of the historically oriented philosophy of science deplored the lack of real life in the reconstructions, these being “generally unrecognizable as science to either historians of science or scientists themselves” (Kuhn, see §I of [13]). In other words, what looked too descriptive for the constructivists appeared too normative for the historians. Reconstructionism thus cornered from two sides is the subject of papers [13] and [14] and is defended against its opponents, mainly those in the Kuhn/Feyerabend camp.1