Perspectivity and the Principle of Continuity
Everyday speech, as much learned discourse, often refers to particular things as first coming into existence and then later expiring. The reality of the particular entity or event is then discerned, identified, and even explained, in terms of the quantified temporal distance between these identifiable termini of its duration. This common manner of speaking and thinking presumes to understand particular entities and events as though the identity of each is somehow contained within its determinate temporal boundaries; we identify particular people, things, and events by means of their bi-terminal dates. And we speak of a person, a thing, an event in terms of its beginning and its end, as though these two chronological notations were preeminently intrinsic to the nature of its being.
KeywordsEurope Posit Dura Metaphor Ethos
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