Abstract
The question of how scientific hypotheses are formed is an intriguing problem that has puzzled psychologists and philosophers of science for a long time. More recently it has been studied from the point of view of artificial intelligence (see Notes A) and this may eventually lead to a better understanding of how humans create hypotheses. The way hypotheses are suggested in the sciences may have more in common with the mental processes of artistic creation than with the strict schemes of the computer programs used in artificial intelligence.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1981 Springer-Verlag New York Inc.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Grenander, U. (1981). Patterns of Scientific Hypotheses. In: Regular Structures. Applied Mathematical Sciences, vol 33. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5905-3_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5905-3_7
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-90560-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-4612-5905-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive