Abstract
The question of whether nonhuman animals have a right to life has less practical importance than one might think, for even if they have no such right, the slaughter of nonhumans can still be condemned on other grounds. The principal human activities that involve killing animals—hunting, trapping, meat production, and scientific research—all involve such cruelty that they should be rejected for that reason alone.2 If, in addition, the animals have a right to life that is violated, the already conclusive case against those practices is simply made stronger. Nevertheless, the question in my title does have some practical importance, for there are some cases of painless killing not covered by the moral prohibition on cruelty. And of course it has considerable theoretical interest, not only for those concerned with animal welfare, but for all those interested more generally in the concept of the right to life.
This essay is a companion to an earlier one, “Do Animals Have a Right to Liberty?” which appeared in Regan and Singer, 1976, pp. 205–223.
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References
This essay is a companion to an earlier one, “Do Animals Have a Right to Liberty?” which appeared in Regan and Singer, 1976, pp. 205–223.
On hunting and trapping, see Amory, 1974. On meat production see Singer, 1975. On the use of animals in scientific research, see Ryder, 1975. Argus Archives, of New York, publishes a number of useful short books on animal abuse, such as Redding and Stewart, 1977, and Pratt, 1976. Since arguments founded upon opposition to cruelty are bound to be clearer and less controversial than appeals to a “right to life,” animal welfare activists are wise to avoid the latter notion when possible.
Leonard S. Carrier makes this point about Tooley’s thesis in Carrier, 1975, pp. 292–293.
See Thomas Nagel, “Death,” in Rachels, 1979, pp. 449–459. This essay deserves a place among the classic refutations of hedonism.
Miami Herald, September 29, 1972, p. 29A.
Monkeys even have moral characteristics, such as compassion. On this, see J. Rachels, “Do Animals Have a Right to Liberty?”
In his essay “Life, Death, and Animals: Prolegomena,” included in this volume, Edward Johnson asks “Why should mental complexity count for anything?” and he concludes that it should not.
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© 1983 The HUMANA Press Inc.
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Rachels, J. (1983). Do Animals Have a Right to Life?. In: Miller, H.B., Williams, W.H. (eds) Ethics and Animals. Contemporary Issues in Biomedicine, Ethics, and Society. Humana Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5623-6_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5623-6_19
Publisher Name: Humana Press
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