Abstract
“Defamation” is a term from the early Middle Ages and Church law, which signified “that evil reputation which is sufficiently notorious to put a man on his trial.”130 Today, it is defined as an invasion of a person’s reputation and good name.131 A complaint for defamation may be based on a false statement, spoken (slander) or written (libel), that exposes a person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or which causes a person to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure that person in his or her occupation.132 Because online communication presently consists, for the most part, of the transfer of written text, online defamation claims are considered under libel law. This will change as real-time audio, now available through Internet videoconferencing packages, is incorporated into online systems.
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References
T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed., 1956), 484.
W. Prosser, Torts § 111 (4th ed., 1971).
See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 45 (libel), 46 (slander).
See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Sews. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 229, 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (1995) (“[O]ne who repeats or otherwise republishes a libel is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.”); Hellar v. Bianco, 111 Cal.App.2d 424, 244 P.2d 757 (1952) (bar owner liable for defamatory remarks written on men’s room wall, a bartender having been asked and having failed to remove the remarks).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964).
So classified because of “the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the public’s attention.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 345, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974). Notably, a person may be a “public figure” for some issues and not for others. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 870 (oil company president held limited purpose public figure regarding management and structure of company); cf. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F.Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff’d, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Defining public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall”).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974).
139 Suarez Corp. Industries v, Meeks, Case No. 267513, Brief In Support of Motion of Defendant Brock M. Meeks for Summary Judgment (Ct. Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Oh. August 2, 1994).
See W. Prosser, Torts § 116 (4th ed. 1971).
See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 47; Shahvar v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.App.4th 653, 663 (1994) (except for fair reports in public journals, Section 47 privileges are not “designed to protect a party’s statements about litigation to someone entirely unrelated to the litigation.”); see also Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Hagler, 880 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App. 1994) (reversing jury verdict against employer over termination notice posted on internal company bulletin boards, including alleged theft of company telephone as reason for termination, on grounds plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing employer lost qualified privilege by acting with actual malice).
It’s in the Cards v. Fuschetto, 193 Wis.2d 429, 535 N.W.2d 11 (Ct. App. 1995).
Ibid., 193 Wis. 2d 429, 535 N.W. 2d 11, 14 (Ct. App. 1995).
776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
See Church of Scientology v. Minnesota State Medical Asso. Foundation, 264 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Minn. 1978) (“Those who merely deliver or transmit defamatory material previously published by another will be considered to have published the material only if they knew, or had reason to know, that the material was false and defamatory. It is this rule that protects libraries and vendors of books, magazines, and newspapers.”); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lesesne, 182 F.2d 135, 136–37 (4th Cir. 1950) (telegraph company); see also, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 4 L.Ed.2d 205, 80 S.Ct. 215 (1959) (bookseller); Anderson v. New York Tel Co., 361 N.Y.S.2d 913, 916, 320 N.E.2d 647 (1974) (telephone company is “privileged under its tariff restrictions to terminate service for cause only in certain prescribed circumstances none of which encompass the subscriber’s dissemination of defamatory messages”).
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 140–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). On the duty to investigate, see McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharmaceuticals, 613 F.Supp. 1349, 1356 (D.D.C. 1985), affd in part and rev’d in part, 800 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The courts have required a showing of special circumstances imposing a duty on the distributor to ascertain the defamatory character of the publication.”); and compare Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 611 F.Supp. 781, 786–87 (D. Wyo. 1985), with Spence v. Flynt, 647 F.Supp. 1266, 1274 (D. Wyo. 1986).
1995 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 229, 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
Auvilv. CBS “60 Minutes,” 800 F.Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
Ibid., 800 F.Supp. 928, 931–32 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
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© 1997 Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
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Rosenoer, J. (1997). Defamation. In: CyberLaw. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-4064-8_3
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