Cognitive Representation: A Psychology in Search of Mentality

  • Leendert P. Mos
Part of the Recent Research in Psychology book series (PSYCHOLOGY)


A critique of representational theory in contemporary cognitive psychology from a phenomenological viewpoint. It is concluded that representational, cognitive, theory as a naturalistic, causal, theory of meaning and reference fails as a psychology of the mental.


Cognitive Theory Intentional Object Transcendental Philosophy Causal Framework Cognitive Penetrability 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag New York Inc. 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leendert P. Mos
    • 1
  1. 1.University of AlbertaEdmontonCanada

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