Abstract
Several modern cryptosystems can be abused, or in other words, used for different purposes than intended. Modern signature systems, for example, allow the undersigned to hide an encrypted message in the signature. Avoiding this is crucial in the context of verification of international peace treaties. In this paper we solve the above problem, and in general, demonstrate how one can prevent abuses of cryptosystems.
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Desmedt, Y. (1990). Protecting against Abuses of Cryptosystems in Particular in the Context of Verification of Peace Treaties. In: Capocelli, R.M. (eds) Sequences. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-3352-7_31
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-3352-7_31
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