Equilibrium in Supergames
This paper is the first part of Research Memorandum 25, The Center for Research in Game Theory and Mathematical Economy which was published in May 1977 and was based on my M.Sc. Thesis, written in 1975–6 at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem under the supervision of Professor B. Peleg. Other parts of the report were published in “Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion,” J. Econ. Theory 21 (1979) 1–9, and “Strong Perfect Equilibrium in Supergames,” International J. Game Theory 9 (1980) 1–12. The main theorem in this paper was discovered simultaneously by R. J. Aumann and L. S. Shapley.
KeywordsGame Theory Evaluation Relation Mixed Strategy Cooperative Game Strategic Form
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