More Conflict

Abstract

In this chapter, we continue our study of 2 × 2 ordinal games (and variants thereof) with particular emphasis on game-theoretic models of international conflict. Section 7.2 contains an application of 2 × 2 ordinal games to the Yom Kippur War. This model, although enlightening, unfortunately fails to explain the actual sequence of events that unfolded. This shortcoming is rectified in Section 7.3 where we present a slightly altered version of the so-called theory of moves from Brams (1985a, 1985b, 1994). In Section 7.4 we consider the joint U.S.-Soviet policy of mutual assured destruction (“MAD”) from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. This treatment of deterrence tries to take into account not only the actual preferences of each side, but also each side’s perception (perhaps better: fear) of the other’s preferences. In Section 7.5 we return to the issue of deterrence and follow Brams (1985a, 1985b) in considering a model of deterrence based on Chicken, but with the choice of strategies being “probabilistic.” This section also introduces the ideas of cardinal utilities and expected value, thus setting the stage for an introduction of 2 × 2 zero-sum games in Section 7.6.