Abstract
The classical prisoner’s dilemma model discussed in Chapter 3 assumes that there are only two types of interaction behaviors: being good all of the time or being bad all of the time. Real people, of course, are not nearly that simple-minded in choosing their interaction behavior. A person can keep track in his mind of his own past interaction behavior and the result of that behavior, as well as the past interaction behavior of others. This enables a person to learn from this past interaction history and to adapt his behavior accordingly. Two models in Chapter 3 examined the easiest adaptation that a person can make based on the past, which is to simply refuse to interact with anyone who has treated him, or someone he knows, badly before. There are numerous other, more sophisticated adaptations that can be made based on a person’s memory of past behavior. For example, a person could interact with anyone regardless of past behavior, but tailor his behavior based on that person’s past history. Another response could involve introspection in which a person monitors his own interaction history and adjusts his behavior based on how well his past behavior haspaid offfor him. In this chapter, we look at models of each of these behavioral strategies and their effect on an individual’s resource levels over time.
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“We know how to behave! We’ve had lessons.” —John Lennon in A Hard Day’s Night (1964)
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Gaylord, R.J., D’Andria, L.J. (1998). Choosing How to Behave. In: Simulating Society. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1726-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1726-8_4
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
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