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A Game Variant of the Stopping Problem on Jump Processes with a Monotone Rule

  • Jun-ichi Nakagami
  • Masami Kurano
  • Masami Yasuda
Conference paper
Part of the Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games book series (AISDG, volume 5)

Abstract

A continuous-time version of the multivariate stopping problem is considered. Associated with vector-valued jump stochastic processes, stopping problems with a monotone logical rule are defined under the notion of the Nash equilibrium point. The existence of an equilibrium strategy and its characterization by integral equations are obtained. Illustrative examples are provided.

Keywords

Equilibrium Strategy Jump Process Noncooperative Game Borel Measurable Function Unanimity Rule 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jun-ichi Nakagami
    • 1
  • Masami Kurano
    • 1
  • Masami Yasuda
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Mathematics and InformaticsChiba UniversityChibaJapan

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