Management of Effluent Discharges: A Dynamic Game Model

  • Jacek B. Krawczyk
Conference paper
Part of the Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games book series (AISDG, volume 2)


This paper is concerned with the problem of the management of effluent dumped into a stream by identifiable polluters. The problem involves a Regional Council which imposes environmental levies on the polluters whose economic activity, otherwise beneficial for the region, results in pollution of the stream. The model for the problem of effluent management is formulated as a dynamic game between the Regional Council and the polluters. The game is “played” in discrete time. The players in the game are the polluters ( “followers” ) and the Council (the “leader”). This formulation leads naturally to a Stackelberg concept of the solution for the game at hand. Because of the obvious difficulties implied by this solution concept, an equilibrium will be sought through the use of an applicable Decision Support Tool wherever an analytical solution appears intractable.

The polluters are supposed to be myopic and small; and the Regional Council is interested in promoting production, collecting taxes, and maintaining a clean environment. The model of spread of the pollution within the stream allows for advection and biodegradation.


Decision Support Tool Dynamic Game Regional Council Effluent Discharge Abatement Effort 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jacek B. Krawczyk
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Commerce and AdministrationVictoria University of WellingtonWellingtonNew Zealand

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