Preventing Minority Disenfranchisement Through Dynamic Bayesian Reapportionment of Legislative Voting Power

  • Lee Papayanopoulos
Conference paper
Part of the Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games book series (AISDG, volume 1)

Abstract

Political reapportionment aims to distribute the power of n decision makers equitably. However, the models used to describe the underlying game, for the purposes of reapportionment, have been a priori models. They are based on assumptions which include: that elected representatives vote independently of one another and of party ideology, that they cast Yeas and Nays with equal probability, and that they are never absent or abstaining. The prior power distributions engendered by such models differ significantly from those realized in practice. Traditional reapportionment provides no means for eliminating the inequities that may ensue—except, perhaps, through litigation.

We propose an a posteriori model under which the fairness of the legislative game is monitored and, when players are found to be underenfranchised, they are compensated. We employ a generalized (empirical) semivalue and describe a procedure for testing the fairness of this statistic.

Keywords

Autocorrelation 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lee Papayanopoulos
    • 1
  1. 1.Rutgers Faculty of ManagementNewarkUSA

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