This chapter begins with an introduction to Games Theory, describes types of competitive problems, which can be modelled and solved by the Games Theory, and also provides details of solution methods for zero-sum games with two players. Then, it proposes a varied combination of Games Theory problems and provides their corresponding solution. This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the problems in which more than one decision maker intervenes, who are conflictive. This chapter also proposes problems in which the players, their strategies, and the profits or costs that each would obtain per strategies combination, are identified, and the most suitable strategies should be obtained for the players.
KeywordsMarket Share Pure Strategy Linear Programming Model Payoff Matrix Advertising Campaign
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