Rethinking the Social Contract: An Agent-Based Model Approach

  • Marta Posada
  • Cesáreo Hernández-Iglesias
Conference paper


The actual crisis has brought to a forefront the failure in wealth distribution and it has questioned market with democracy. It has vividly demonstrated the deficiencies in the outdated current economic theories, calling for rethinking Economics. Agent Based Modelling (ABM) applied to this economic rethinking is a choice, a challenge and a promise. Market efficiency has received attention from ABM experts and the authors. However, they have not studied the wealth distribution problem. In this paper, using an agent-based model approach, we study the sensitivity of wealth distribution to the agents’ behavior in a Continuous Double Auction market. We find that the inequality on wealth distribution increases as the percentage of parasitic agents grows.


Artificial economics Continuous double auction Behavioral economics Social contract Growth and welfare 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.INSISOC. Escuela de Ingenierías IndustrialesUniversidad de ValladolidValladolidSpain

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