Abstract
The goal of this chapter is to provide a study of the coalition formation problem in supply chains using Hedonic cooperative games. The goal is to focus on the problems of (i) coalition structure generation, i.e., formation of coalition structures, such that agents inside a coalition coordinate their activities, but agents of different coalitions will work independently; and (ii) worth sharing, i.e., distribution of the worth generated by the coalition to its agents. We namely demonstrate that when cost-based proportional rule and equal allocation rule are used to divide the total created value, the efficient coalitions always exist and satisfy a set of desirable properties. Further; with the general results, we go deeper into a non-superadditive joint replenishment game with full truckload shipments for which we provide a polynomial algorithmic solution to generate the coalitions
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© 2014 Springer-Verlag London
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Elomri, A., Jemai, Z., Ghaffari, A., Dallery, Y. (2014). Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures: Application to a Supply Chain Game. In: Benyoucef, L., Hennet, JC., Tiwari, M. (eds) Applications of Multi-Criteria and Game Theory Approaches. Springer Series in Advanced Manufacturing. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5295-8_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5295-8_15
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