Incentives in Organizations: Can Economics and Psychology Coexist in Human Resources Management?

  • Ugo MerloneEmail author


Several disciplines have approached Human Resources Management (HRM) from different perspectives with several authors providing interesting contributions but often ignoring each other. In this chapter, I will illustrate how Economics and Psychology approach HRM in order to point out differences but also to areas of intersection between these two important disciplines. I will mainly concentrate on Economics and Psychology, not for the sake of some alleged priority or superiority of these disciplines, but rather for being more familiar with this literature. In the future research it would be interesting to add perspectives coming from other disciplines. Psychology and Economics, as social sciences, often deal with models of human behavior. It is well known that these two disciplines offer contrasting theories of human behavior on virtually every major point (DeAngelo et al. 2011). One strong point of disagreement is rationality (Smith 1991). We will see that the contrast on rationality is not limited to Economics and Psychology. Even if the differences between these two disciplines are often stark, they both agree on incompleteness of contracts. In this chapter, I will explore how these disciplines approach this gap, what are the main differences, and the possible integrations.


Human Resource Management Procedural Justice Psychological Contract Employment Contract Contract Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer-Verlag London 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of TorinoTorinoItaly

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