Tripartite Game Analysis of Enterprises in Choosing of Production Mode

  • Honglei Tang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 205)


The paper researches the government, the consumer and the enterprise that are in the process of choosing the production mode. By game theory, the paper focus on a probe into the problems such as the choice between low carbon emission and high carbon emission for enterprises in the production process, the behavior adopted by consumers, and the efficiency of the government’s supervision in this issue. According to the assumptions, the paper created a sequential game model of the tripartite participants. Using of converse inductive method, the paper solve the game model. The result shows that enterprises’ adoption of low carbon production, government regulation is in place, the consumer’s active purchase are ideal conditions for healthy development of the low carbon economy.


Low carbon production Tripartite game Sequential game theory 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Huzhou Teachers CollegeHuzhouPeople’s Republic of China
  2. 2.School of ManagementShanghai UniversityShanghaiPeople’s Republic of China

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