Skip to main content

Financial Transmission Rights: Point-to Point Formulations

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Financial Transmission Rights

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Energy ((LNEN,volume 7))

Abstract

Transmission rights stand at the center of market design in a restructured electricity industry. Beginning with the intuition that electricity markets require some rights to use the transmission system, simple models of transmission rights soon founder after confronting the limited capacity and complex interactions of a transmission grid. The industry searched for many years without success looking for a workable system of physical rights that would support decentralized decisions controlling use of the grid.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 189.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    This paper is an abridged version of the working paper, Hogan (2002). The working paper includes an elaboration of flowgate financial transmission rights and hybrid models.

  2. 2.

    Similar qualifications appear in discussions of an introduction of options or flowgate rights in PJM, New York, New England, the Midwest, and so on.

  3. 3.

    For an excellent summary of the basics for those other than electrical engineers, see Elgerd (1982), pp. 19–32.

  4. 4.

    Atypical negative prices are allowed, and in the presence of system congestion may not be so atypical.

  5. 5.

    In anticipation of later simplifications, the notation here follows the development of the “DC” Load Flow model in Schweppe et al. (1988), Appendices A and D. The DC Load flow refers to the real power half of the nonlinear AC load flow model. Under the maintained assumptions, there is a weak link between the reactive power and real power halves of the full problem. And the real power flow equations have the same general form as the direct current flow equations in a purely resistive network; hence the name “DC Load Flow.” Similar linear approximations are available for reactive power flow, but the approximation is poor in a heavily loaded system. Hence, if in addition to real power flow, voltage constraints and the associated reactive power are important, then we require the full AC model and spot pricing theory as in Caramanis (1982).

  6. 6.

    For a development of the \( {{\Pi}} \) equivalent representation of a transmission line, see Bergen (1986), Chap. 4. Here we follow Wood and Wollenberg (1984) in representing Bcap as one-half the total line capacitance in the \( \Pi \) equivalent representation; (Wood and Wollenberg 1984), p.75. A. See also Skilling (1951), pp. 126–133.

  7. 7.

    Here the notation follows Schweppe et al. (1988). The purpose is to connect to the discussion of the economics of spot markets and the definition of FTRs. However, the electrical engineering literature follows different notational conventions. For example, Wood and Wollenberg (1984) and others use a different sign convention for \( \Omega \). Also note that here V i is the magnitude of the complex voltage at bus i, not the complex voltage itself as in the appendix. Finally, we use y to denote the net loads at the buses. This should not be confused with the complex admittance matrix, often denoted as Y, which is composed of the elements of G and \( \Omega \). See the appendix for further discussion.

  8. 8.

    For details, see the appendix.

  9. 9.

    The convention here is that gradients are row vectors. Hence, with

    $$ f\left( {u,v} \right)=\left[ {\begin{array}{lll}{{f_1}\left( {u,v} \right)} \\{{f_2}\left( {u,v} \right)} \\\end{array}} \right],\quad \nabla f=\left[ {\begin{array}{lll}{{{{\partial {f_1}\left( {u,v} \right)}} \left/ {{\partial u}} \right.}} & {{{{\partial {f_1}\left( {u,v} \right)}} \left/ {{\partial v}} \right.}} \\{{{{\partial {f_2}\left( {u,v} \right)}} \left/ {{\partial u}} \right.}} & {{{{\partial {f_2}\left( {u,v} \right)}} \left/ {{\partial v}} \right.}} \\\end{array}} \right]. $$
  10. 10.

    The swing bus is a δV bus for which the angle and the voltage are exogenous.

  11. 11.

    Cadwalader et al. (1998) provides an outline of transmission rights and revenue adequacy in the context of explicit reserve markets. The analysis is limited to point-to-point obligations, as discussed below, but could be extended to include other types of financial transmission rights.

  12. 12.

    This is similar to the formulation in Caramanis et al. (1982); the principal difference is in imposing the thermal limit not just on the real power flow, but on the total MVA flow to account for the total thermal impact. The constraints could also include generator capability tradeoffs. See Feinstein et al. (1988), pp. 22–26, for a discussion of the generator capability curve tradeoffs between real and reactive power.

  13. 13.

    As an historical note, apparently the early work on optimality conditions by Kuhn and Tucker was motivated by an inquiry into the theory of electrical networks. Kuhn (2002), p. 132.

  14. 14.

    The dispatch and prices are not changed by the arbitrary designation of the swing bus. However, the choice of the reference bus for pricing, which need not be the same as the swing bus, does affect the decomposition of the prices.

  15. 15.

    A simultaneous loss of multiple facilities would be defined as a single contingency.

  16. 16.

    Expressing the limits in terms of MW and real power is shorthand for ease of explanation. Line limits in AC models appear in terms of MVA for real and reactive power.

  17. 17.

    A sufficient condition for these to obtain would be that the demand and supply functions at each node are continuous, additively separable and aggregate into a downward sloping net demand curve. The benefit function would be the area under the demand curves minus the area under the supply curves in the usual consumer plus producer surplus interpretation at equilibrium. To avoid notational complexity, the assumption here is that each participant has a continuously differentiable concave benefit function defined across the net loads at every location. Concavity is important for the analysis below of the equivalence of economic dispatch and market equilibrium, if there is a market equilibrium. This would eliminate from this competitive market analysis the related unit commitment problem which includes non-convex start-up conditions. As is well known, in the presence of non-concave benefit functions there may be no competitive market equilibrium. Differentiability can be relaxed, with no more than the possibility of multiple equilibrium prices. Restricting the benefit function to definition at a subset of the locations would be more realistic, but different only in the need to account for the corresponding variable definitions. It would not affect the results presented here. In practice, as is often assumed, the benefits functions may be separable across locations.

  18. 18.

    The partial equilibrium assumptions are that electricity is a small part of the overall economy with consequent small wealth effects, and prices of other goods and services are approximately unaffected by changes in the electricity market. See Mas-Colell et al. (1995), pp. 311–343. Importantly, we adopt here a relaxed set of assumptions that do not include convexity of the set of feasible net loads.

  19. 19.

    It is the standard formulation to include both the consumption (1.7) and production (1.8) sectors as part of the definition of competitive market equilibrium. Failure to follow this well established convention leads to confusion when the term “market equilibrium” is applied excluding the producing sector in (1.8), as in Wu et al. (1996), pp. 5–24. For a further discussion of equivalence results, see Boucher and Smeers (2001), pp. 821–838.

  20. 20.

    For more detail on the construction of the gradients, see Weber (1997).

  21. 21.

    For example, firms providing such software include ALSTOM ESCA Corporation, Nexant, Inc., Open Access Technology International, Inc.

  22. 22.

    For examples, see Hogan (2000).

  23. 23.

    For simplicity, we can assume that the ideal transformers with a fixed tap ratio have been incorporated in a per unit normalization, which results in a simplified \( \Pi \) equivalent representation of a transmission line. See the appendix for further details

  24. 24.

    Also the transfer admittance matrix as described in Schweppe et al. (1988), p. 316.

  25. 25.

    For example, see Oliveira et al. (1999), pp. 111–118.

  26. 26.

    This approximation applies to high voltage systems, but is less usable on lower voltage circuits.

  27. 27.

    This approach is from Transpower in New Zealand.

  28. 28.

    A version of this DC-Load-Flow implementation with losses appears in a GAMS model available at www.whogan.com.

  29. 29.

    For further details, see Harvey et al. (1997).

  30. 30.

    For further discussion of market structure, see Chandley and Hogan (2002).

  31. 31.

    The definition of FTRs could be extended to include the sharing rule for allocation of any difference between the collections and payments. This is formalized in the market equilibrium model as s i . In practice, the FTR implementations for existing system redistribute any excess collection to reduce access charges or some similar purpose. Although this is a more important issue for defining incentives for system expansion, it does not affect the analysis here.

  32. 32.

    For results of New York auctions, see: http://www.nyiso.com/markets/tcc_auctions/2001_2002_winter.html.

  33. 33.

    For a further discussion see Harvey and Hogan (2002).

  34. 34.

    In PJM, financial transmission rights are called fixed transmission rights (FTR).

    http://www.pjm.com/energy/ftr/ftrauc.html.

  35. 35.

    In New York, financial transmission rights are called Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCC).

  36. 36.

    It is a conjecture, but not proven, that this “optimized” FTR-loss rental is always non-negative, and that simultaneous feasibility alone is sufficient for revenue adequacy in this congestion-only case.

  37. 37.

    The FTRs may be revenue adequate under some dispatch cases without simultaneous feasibility, but not under all dispatch cases. For instance, if the FTRs follow the same pattern as the dispatch, but imply even more of the valuable flows than is feasible, the FTRs would not be revenue adequate.

  38. 38.

    These two definitions would be the same if there is a saddle point for the function \( f\left( {y,u} \right)=\mathop{Max}\limits_{{i,\omega }}K_i^{\omega}\left( {y,u} \right). \) However, the usual convexity arguments would not apply to guarantee a saddle point as it seems unlikely that f would be concave in y, Ponstein (1965), pp. 181–188. In any event, the former computational problem appears more difficult.

  39. 39.

    This is a parametric satisfaction problem in the terminology of Shimuzu et al. (1997), p. 285.

  40. 40.

    Note: in the early stages of the computation, we might accept both the DC-Load solution and the associated DC-Load shift factors as the estimates of the linearized constraint. However, when close to the solution, the assumption that the DC-Load model is inadequate means that we need an exact evaluation of both the function and the linearized representation of any violated constraint.

  41. 41.

    Here we follow the applications Shimuzu et al. (1997), p. 28. A generalized gradient of a function f(x) at the point \( \bar{x} \) is defined as \( {\partial^o}f\left( {\bar{x}} \right) \) in terms of the generalized directional derivative as the set of vectors

    $$ \begin{array}{lll}{\partial^o}f\left( {\bar{x}} \right)=\left\{ {\gamma \in {R^n}|{f^o}\left( {\bar{x}:s} \right)\geq {\gamma^t}s,\forall s\in {R^n}} \right\}, \hfill \\ where \hfill \\ {f^o}\left( {\bar{x}:s} \right)=\mathop{{\lim \sup }}\limits_{{\begin{array}{lll}{\scriptstyle x\to \bar{x}} \\{\scriptstyle \tau \downarrow 0} \\\end{array}}}\frac{{f\left( {x+\tau s} \right)-f(x)}}{\tau }. \hfill\end{array} $$
  42. 42.

    Normal is a term of art, not necessarily intended to mean “usual.” A system is normal if for each parallel path the product of ideal transformer gain magnitudes is equal and the sum of ideal transformer phase shifts is the same. See Bergen and Vittal (2000), pp. 154–175.

References

  • Bergen AR (1986) Power systems analysis. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergen AR, Vittal V (2000) Power systems analysis, 2nd edn. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, pp 154–175

    Google Scholar 

  • Bertsekas DP (1995) Nonlinear programming. Athena Scientific, Belmont, MA, p 427

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Boucher J, Smeers Y (2001) Alternative models of restructured electricity systems, part 1: no market power. Oper Res 9(6):821–838

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boucher J, Ghilain B, Smeers Y (1998) Security-constrained dispatch gives financially and economically significant nodal prices. Elec J 11:53–59

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cadwalader MD, Harvey SM, Hogan WW, Pope SL (1998) Reliability, scheduling markets, and electricity pricing. Center for Business and Government, Harvard University, May 1998

    Google Scholar 

  • Caramanis MC, Bohn RE, Schweppe FC (1982) Investment decisions and long-term planning under electricity spot pricing. IEEE Trans Power Ap Syst PAS-101(12):3234–3245

    Google Scholar 

  • Chandley JD, Hogan WW (2002) Independent transmission companies in a regional transmission organization. Center for Business and Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 8 Jan 2002

    Google Scholar 

  • Clarke FH (1990) Optimization and nonsmooth analysis. SIAM Reprints, Philadelphia, p 10

    Book  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Elgerd OI (1982) Electric energy systems and theory, 2nd edn. McGraw Hill, New York, p 23

    Google Scholar 

  • Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (1996) Capacity reservation open access transmission tariffs. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, RM96-11-000, Washington DC, 24 April 1996

    Google Scholar 

  • Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (2002a) Working paper on standardized transmission service and wholesale electricity market design. Washington, DC, 15 March 2002

    Google Scholar 

  • Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (2002b) Working paper on standardized transmission service and wholesale electricity market design. Washington, DC, 15 March 2002, p 11

    Google Scholar 

  • Feinstein J, Tscherne J, Koenig M (1988) Reactive load and reserve calculation in real-time computer control system. IEEE Comput Appl Power 1(3):22–26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ge SY, Chung TS (1999) Optimal active power flow incorporating power flow control needs in flexible AC transmission systems. IEEE Trans Power Syst 14(2):738–744

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Geoffrion AM (1970) Elements of large-scale mathematical programming, parts I and II. Manag Sci 16(11):652–691

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Grainger JD, Stevenson WD (1994) Power systems analysis. McGraw-Hill, New York, pp 361–367

    Google Scholar 

  • Harvey SM, Hogan WW (2002) Loss hedging financial transmission rights. Center for Business and Government, Harvard University, 15 Jan 2002

    Google Scholar 

  • Harvey SM, Hogan WW, Pope SL (1997) Transmission capacity reservations and transmission congestion contracts, Center for Business and Government, Harvard University, 6 June 1996, (Revised 8 March 8 1997)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hogan H (1992) Contract networks for electric power transmission. J Regul Econ 4:211–242

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hogan WW (2000) Flowgate rights and wrongs. Center for Business and Government, Harvard University, Aug 2000

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn HW (2002) Being in the right place at the right time. Oper Res 50(1):132

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Mas-Colell A, Whinston MD, Green JR (1995) Microeconomic theory. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 311–343

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Oliveira EJ, Marangon JW, Lima JL, Pereira R (1999) Flexible AC transmission system devices: allocation and transmission pricing. Elec Power Energy Syst 21:111–118

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O'Neill RP, Helman U, Hobbs B, Stewart WR, Rothkopf MH (2002) A joint energy and transmission rights auction: proposal and properties. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Working Paper, Feb 2002

    Google Scholar 

  • Ponstein J (1965) An extension of the min-max theorem. SIAM Rev 7(2):181–188

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Schweppe FC, Caramanis MC, Tabors RD, Bohn RE (1988) Spot pricing of electricity. Kluwer Academic, Norwell, MA

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Shimuzu K, Ishizuka Y, Bard JF (1997) Nondifferentiable and two-level mathematical programming. Kluwer Academic, Boston, pp 188–228

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Skilling HH (1951) Electric transmission lines. McGraw Hill, New York, pp 126–133

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber JD (1997) Implementation of a Newton-based optimal power flow into a power system simulation environment. MS Thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois

    Google Scholar 

  • Wood AJ, Wollenberg BF (1984) Power generation, control, and operation. Wiley, New York, p 75

    Google Scholar 

  • Wu F, Varaiya P, Spiller P, Oren S (1996) Folk theorems on transmission access. J Regul Econ 10(1):5–24

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to William W. Hogan .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Appendix: Generic Transmission Line Representation

Appendix: Generic Transmission Line Representation

The generic transmission line analysis employs complex variables. To avoid confusion here, the indexes for the two terminals of the line are k and m. For a development of the model transmission line and transformer model, see Grainger and Stevenson (1994). By choice of parameters, this generic transmission line representation allows for a \( \varPi \)-equivalent representation of a line with no transformer, an ideal transformer, or a combination of both.

Here we follow Weber (1997)’s notation and conventions. This is useful in that Weber also provides an extensive detail on the characterization of the Jacobian of the power flow equations to provide further insight into the implications of the AC power flow model, including calculation of the derivatives with respect to the transformer parameters. As shown in Fig. 1.2 let V k represent the complex voltage with magnitude \( \left| {{V_k}} \right| \) and angle \( {\theta_k} \). The data include the line resistance (r), reactance (x). The transformer includes turns ratio (t km ) and angle change (\( {\alpha_{km }} \)). The line charging capacitance is the complex Y cap .

Fig. 1.2
figure 00012

Transmission line and transformer

The line admittance (y) is the inverse of the line impedance (z) formed from the resistance and reactance.

$$ y=\frac{1}{z}=\frac{1}{r+jx }=\frac{1}{r+jx}\frac{{{{{\left( {r+jx} \right)}}^{*}}}}{{{{{\left( {r+jx} \right)}}^{*}}}}=\frac{1}{r+jx}\frac{r-jx }{r-jx }=\frac{r-jx }{{{r^2}+{x^2}}}=g+jb. $$

With P as the real power and Q as the reactive power, the general rules for complex power (S) have:

$$ S=P+jQ=V{I^{*}}=zI{I^{*}}=z{{\left| I \right|}^2}={{\left( {P-jQ} \right)}^{*}}={{\left( {{V^{*}}I} \right)}^{*}}. $$

The line capacitance is represented here as:

$$ \frac{{{Y_{cap }}}}{2}=0+j{B_{cap }}. $$

Following Weber, for the generic representation in Fig. 1.2, complex current (\( {I_k} \)) from k towards m satisfies:

$$ {I_k}={V_k}\left( {y+\frac{{{Y_{cap }}}}{2}} \right)-{V_m}\frac{{{e^{{-j{\alpha_{km }}}}}}}{{{t_{km }}}}y. $$

Therefore, the complex power flow from k to m is:

$$ \begin{array}{lll} {S_k}={V_k}I_k^{*}={V_k}V_k^{*}{{\left({y+\frac{{{Y_{cap }}}}{2}} \right)}^{*}}-{V_k}V_m^{*}\frac{{{e^{{j{\alpha_{km }}}}}}}{{{t_{km}}}}{y^{*}} \\ ={{\left| {{V_k}} \right|}^2}{{\left({y+\frac{{{Y_{cap }}}}{2}} \right)}^{*}}-\frac{{\left| {{V_k}} \right|\left| {{V_m}} \right|{e^{{j\left({{\theta_k}-{\theta_m}+{\alpha_{km }}} \right)}}}}}{{{t_{km}}}}{y^{*}}, \\ ={{\left| {{V_k}} \right|}^2}\left( {g-j\left({b+{B_{cap }}} \right)} \right)-\frac{{\left| {{V_k}} \right|\left|{{V_m}} \right|}}{{{t_{km }}}}\left( {\cos \left({{\theta_k}-{\theta_m}+{\alpha_{km }}} \right)} +j\sin \left({{\theta_k}-{\theta_m}+{\alpha_{km }}} \right) \right)\left( {g-jb} \right), \\ ={{\left| {{V_k}} \right|}^2}g-\frac{{\left| {{V_k}} \right|\left| {{V_m}} \right|}}{{{t_{km }}}}\left( {g\cos \left({{\theta_k}-{\theta_m}+{\alpha_{km }}} \right)+b\sin \left({{\theta_k}-{\theta_m}+{\alpha_{km }}} \right)} \right) \\ +j\bigg(-\frac{{\left| {{V_k}} \right|\left| {{V_m}} \right|}}{{{t_{km }}}}\bigg( {g\sin \left({{\theta_k}-{\theta_m}+{\alpha_{km }}} \right)-b\cos \left({{\theta_k}-{\theta_m}+{\alpha_{km }}} \right)} \bigg)-{{{\left| {{V_k}} \right|}}^2}\left( {b+{B_{cap }}} \right) \bigg).\end{array}$$

The complex current (\( {I_m} \)) from m towards k is

$$ {I_m}=-{V_k}\frac{{{e^{{j{\alpha_{km }}}}}}}{{{t_{km }}}}y+{V_m}\left( {\frac{1}{{t_{km}^2}}y+\frac{{{Y_{cap }}}}{2}} \right). $$

Hence,

$$ \begin{array}{lll} & {S_m}=-{V_m}V_k^{*}\frac{{{e^{{-j{\alpha_{km }}}}}}}{{{t_{km }}}}{y^{*}}+{V_m}V_m^{*}{{\left( {\frac{1}{{t_{km}^2}}y+\frac{{{Y_{cap }}}}{2}} \right)}^{*}}, \\& \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ =-\frac{{\left| {{V_m}} \right|\left| {{V_k}} \right|{e^{{j\left( {{\theta_m}-{\theta_k}-{\alpha_{km }}} \right)}}}}}{{{t_{km }}}}\left( {g-jb} \right)+{{\left| {{V_m}} \right|}^2}\left( {\frac{g}{{t_{km}^2}}-j\left( {\frac{b}{{t_{km}^2}}+{B_{cap }}} \right)} \right), \\& \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ={{\left| {{V_m}} \right|}^2}\frac{g}{{t_{km}^2}}-\frac{{\left| {{V_m}} \right|\left| {{V_k}} \right|}}{{{t_{km }}}}\left( {g\cos \left( {{\theta_m}-{\theta_k}-{\alpha_{km }}} \right)+b\sin \left( {{\theta_m}-{\theta_k}-{\alpha_{km }}} \right)} \right) \\& \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ +j\left( {-\frac{{\left| {{V_m}} \right|\left| {{V_k}} \right|}}{{{t_{km }}}}\left( {g\sin \left( {{\theta_m}-{\theta_k}-{\alpha_{km }}} \right)-b\cos \left( {{\theta_m}-{\theta_k}-{\alpha_{km }}} \right)} \right)-{{{\left| {{V_m}} \right|}}^2}\left( {\frac{b}{{t_{km}^2}}+{B_{cap }}} \right)} \right).\end{array} $$

If the system is normal and the angle change is fixed, then the angle change can be included in the line admittance. Similarly for normal systems, if the transformer tap setting is fixed, the turns ratio can be included in the per unit normalization of the voltages, which would produce appropriately modified values of y but with the elimination of the separate transformer parameters (t, \( \alpha \)).Footnote 42 Ignoring the line capacitance, this simplified representation would be

$$ \begin{array}{lll} {S_k} = {{\left| {{V_k}} \right|}^2}\hat{g}-\left| {{V_k}} \right|\left| {{V_m}} \right|\left( {\hat{g}\cos \left( {{\theta_k}-{\theta_m}} \right)+\hat{b}\sin \left( {{\theta_k}-{\theta_m}} \right)} \right) \hfill \\ \ \ \ + j\left( {-\left| {{V_k}} \right|\left| {{V_m}} \right|\left( {\hat{g}\sin \left( {{\theta_k}-{\theta_m}} \right)-\hat{b}\cos \left( {{\theta_k}-{\theta_m}} \right)} \right)-{{{\left| {{V_k}} \right|}}^2}\hat{b}} \right). \hfill\end{array} $$

and

$$ \begin{array}{lll} {S_m} = {{\left| {{V_m}} \right|}^2}\hat{g}-\left| {{V_m}} \right|\left| {{V_k}} \right|\left( {\hat{g}\cos \left( {{\theta_m}-{\theta_k}} \right)+\hat{b}\sin \left( {{\theta_m}-{\theta_k}} \right)} \right) \hfill \\ \ \ \ + j\left( {-\left| {{V_m}} \right|\left| {{V_k}} \right|\left( {\hat{g}\sin \left( {{\theta_m}-{\theta_k}} \right)-\hat{b}\cos \left( {{\theta_m}-{\theta_k}} \right)} \right)-{{{\left| {{V_m}} \right|}}^2}\hat{b}} \right). \hfill\end{array} $$

This is a familiar simplification often seen in the electrical engineering literature. However, if the system is not normal, tap ratios are variable, or phase angle adjustments are variable, it will be necessary to use the more general representation as shown above.

The notation translation to the discussion in the main text has:

$$ {G_k}=g,\;{\Omega_k}=-b,\;{\delta_i}={\theta_k},\;{Z_{ij }}={S_k},\;{\alpha_k}={\alpha_{km }},\;{t_k}={t_{km }}. $$

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer-Verlag London

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Hogan, W.W. (2013). Financial Transmission Rights: Point-to Point Formulations. In: Rosellón, J., Kristiansen, T. (eds) Financial Transmission Rights. Lecture Notes in Energy, vol 7. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-4787-9_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-4787-9_1

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4471-4786-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-4787-9

  • eBook Packages: EnergyEnergy (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics