Refinement and Confidentiality

  • Colin O’Halloran
Part of the Workshops in Computing book series (WORKSHOPS COMP.)

Abstract

As computer systems become more powerful and cheaper they permeate more of our everyday life. With this greater reliance on the automated processing and movement of our personal information comes a duty to demonstrate that computer systems are secure. Unfortuneately refinement which preserves “functional” properties does not necessarily preserve properties concerning the confidentiality of information. In this paper a way of describing confidentiality properties independently from “functional” properties is described. The paper goes on to show when “functionality” and confidentiality can be preserved by refinement.

Keywords

Prefix Milton 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Colin O’Halloran
    • 1
  1. 1.DRAMalvern, Worcs.UK

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