The SHIP Safety Case Approach
This paper presents a safety case approach to the justification of safety-related systems. It combines methods used for handling software design faults with approaches used for hazardous plant. The general structure of the safety argument is presented together with the underlying models for system failure that can be used as the basis for quantified reliability estimates. The approach is illustrated using plant and computer based examples.
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