Safe Comp 96 pp 243-249 | Cite as

Specifying Railway Interlocking Requirements for Practical Use

  • Lars-Henrik Eriksson


An essentially complete formal specification of safety requirements for railway interlockings has been developed. The work is part of as project with the Swedish National Rail Administration investigating the feasibility of using formal methods for the analysis of interlockings in a production setting. An overview of the specification is given and two ongoing case studies on verifying interlockings using the specification are described. Verification is done using the very fast Stålmarck theorem prover for propositional logic. The current limits of the technology is discussed.


Formal Method Propositional Logic Program Module Predicate Logic Safety Requirement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lars-Henrik Eriksson
    • 1
  1. 1.Logikkonsult NP ABStockholmSweden

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