Skip to main content

Unprotected Transients

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Fast Spectrum Reactors
  • 2660 Accesses

Abstract

As indicated in the two previous chapters, there are several features that combine to make a SFR system safe and reliable. Only when a major off-normal condition is encountered, combined with a postulated failure of the Plant Protective System (PPS), can serious accident consequences be predicted. Even then, it has been demonstrated that a properly designed SFR can survive unprotected transients without damage to the fuel or other barriers to radiation release.

With this background, it is useful to address accidents in three categories as follows:

Protected transients. An event initiator occurs, such as a component failure, failure of a safety grade system (other than the reactor PPS), or an external event, followed by activation of the plant protection system to shut down the reactor.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 219.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 279.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 379.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    It is conceivable that inherent passive safety features can be classified as a passive alternate to the PPS and can therefore reduce the number of unprotected accidents that must be considered. Such events can be classified as “accommodated” transients as the plant and fuel system design features are adequate to mitigate the consequences of the event initiator without actuation of the PPS. Such classification is very specific to the plant and fuel system design, and is not addressed here.

  2. 2.

    As noted later in this section, these phenomena are the key inherent reactivity feedback mechanisms to compensate for changes in core power and temperature during transient conditions. They are the primary mechanisms for reactivity control at the designers’ disposal when incorporating inherent passive safety features into SFR designs.

References

  1. R. Wigeland, and J. Cahalan, “Mitigation of Severe Accident Consequences Using Inherent Safety Principals,” Fast Reactor Safety 2009, Tokyo, Japan, December 2009.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Ph. Bergeonneau, et al., “Uncertainty Analysis on the Measurements and Calculation of Feedback Reactivity Effect in LMFBRs, Application of Super-Phenix-1 Startup Experiments,” 30th NEACRP Meeting, NEACRP-A-833, Helsinki, Finland, September 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  3. R. W. Schaefer, “Critical Experiment Tests of Bowing and Expansion Reactivity Calculations for Liquid-Metal-Cooled Fast Reactors,” Nuclear Science and Engineering, 103, 196, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  4. E. E. Lewis, Nuclear Power Reactor Safety, chapter 7, Wiley, New York, NY, 1977.

    Google Scholar 

  5. W. C. Horak, J. G. Guppy, and R. J. Kennett, Validation of SSC Using the FFTF Natural-Circulation Tests, BNL-NUREG-31437, Brookhaven National Laboratory Report, Upton, NY, December 1982.

    Google Scholar 

  6. L. K. Chang, et al., “Experimental and Analytical Study of Loss-of-Flow Transients in EBR-II Occurring at Decay Power Levels,” Conference on Alternative Energy Sources, Miami Beach, FL, December 1985.

    Google Scholar 

  7. K. M. Tabb, et al., MELT-III B – An Updated Version of the MELT Code, HEDL-TME 78-108, Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, Richland, WA, 1978.

    Google Scholar 

  8. J. E. Cahalan, and T. Y. Wei, “Modeling Developments for the SAS4A and SASSYS Computer Codes,” International Conference on Fast Reactor Safety, American Nuclear Society, Snowbird, UT, August 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  9. M. G. Stevenson, et al., “Current Status and Experimental Basis of the SAS LMFBR Accident Analysis Code,” Proceedings of the Conference on Fast Reactor Safety, CONF-740401-P3, p. 1303, Beverly Hills, CA, 1974.

    Google Scholar 

  10. A. M. Tentner, et al., “SAS4A Computer Model for the Analysis of Hypothetical Core Disruptive Accidents in Liquid Metal Reactors,” Eastern Computer Simulation Conference, Orlando, FL, April 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  11. F. E. Dunn, and T. C. Wei, “The Role of SASSYS-1 in LMR Safety Analysis,” Proceedings of the International Topical Meeting on Safety of Next Generation Power Reactors, Seattle, WA, May 1988.

    Google Scholar 

  12. L. E. Strawbridge, and G. H. Clare, “Exclusion of Core Disruptive Accidents from the Design Basis Accident Envelope in CRBRP,” Proceedings of the International Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety, Vol. 1, pp. 317–327, American Nuclear Society, Knoxville, TN, April 21–25, 1985.

    Google Scholar 

  13. J. E. Cahalan, R. A. Wigeland, G. Friedel, G. Kussmaul, J. Moreau, M. Perks, and P. Royal, “Performance of Metal and Oxide Fuels During Accidents in a Large Liquid Metal Cooled Reactors,” Proceedings of the International Fast Reactor Safety Meeting, Vol. IV, p. 73, Snowbird, UT, August 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  14. A. E. Wright, et al., “CAFÉ Experiments on the Flow and Freezing of Metal Fuel and Cladding Melts (2), Results, Analysis, and Applications,” International Conference on Fast Reactors and Related Fuel Cycles (FR09), Kyoto, Japan, December 7–11, 2009.

    Google Scholar 

  15. D. E. Smith, F. J. Martin, and A. Padilla, Internal Fuel-Motion Phenomenology: FUMO-E Code Analysis of PINEX Experiments, HEDL-SA-2629-FP, June 1982; D. R. Porten, et al., “PINEX-2 Experiment, Concept Verification of an Inherent Shutdown Mechanism for HCDA’s,” Proceedings of the International Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety Technology, Seattle, WA, August 19–23, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  16. P. C. Ferrell, D. R. Porten, and R. J. Martin, “Internal Fuel Motion as an Inherent Shutdown Mechanism for LMFBR Accidents: PINEX-3, PINEX-2, and HUT 5-2A Experiments,” HEDL-SA-2264, Fast Reactor Safety Meeting, Sun Valley, Idaho, August 2, 1981.

    Google Scholar 

  17. E. T. Weber, et al., “Transient Survivability of LMFBR Oxide Fuel Pins,” HEDL-SA-3349, British Nuclear Energy Society Conference on Science and Technology of Fast Reactor Safety, Guernsey, Channel Islands, May 12–16, 1986.

    Google Scholar 

  18. A. L. Pitner, et al., “TS-1 and TS-2 Transient Overpower Tests on FFTF Fuel,” Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, 50, 351–352, 1985.

    Google Scholar 

  19. A. E. Waltar, N. P. Wilburn, D. C. Kolesar, L. D. O’Dell, A. Padilla, L. N. Stewart (HEDL), and W. L. Partain (NUS), An Analysis of the Unprotected Transient Overpower Accident in the FTR, HEDL-TME-75-50, Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, Richland, WA, June 1975.

    Google Scholar 

  20. R. N. Koopman, et al., “TREAT Transient Overpower Experiment R12,” Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, 28, 482, 1978.

    Google Scholar 

  21. T. M. Burke, “Summary of FY 1997 Work Related to JAPC-US DOE Contract ‘Study on Improvement of Core Safety – Study on GEM (III)’ ”, HNF-2195-VA, DOE Technical Exchange, Tokyo Japan, February 10, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  22. H. P. Planchon, et al., “The Experimental Breeder Reactor II Inherent Shutdown and Heat Removal Tests – Results and Analysis,” Proceedings of the International Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety, Vol. 1, pp. 281–291, American Nuclear Society, Knoxville, TN, April 21–25, 1985.

    Google Scholar 

  23. T. H. Baur, Behavior of Metallic Fuel in TREAT Transient Overpower Tests, CONF-880506-14, TI88 010042, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL, May 17, 1988.

    Google Scholar 

  24. A. M. Tentner Kalimullah, and K. J. Miles, “Analysis of Metal Fuel Transient Overpower Experiments with the SAS4A Accident Analysis Code,” Proceedings of the International Conference on Fast Reactor Safety, American Nuclear Society, Snowbird, UT, August 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  25. D. J. Hill, “An Overview of the EBR-II PRA,” Proceedings of the 1990 International Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety Meeting, Vol. IV, p. 33, Snowbird, UT, August 12–16, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  26. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report for the Power Reactor Innovative Small Module (PRISM) Liquid Metal Reactor, NUREG-1368, Washington, DC, February 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  27. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report for the Sodium Advanced Fast Reactor (SAFR) Liquid Metal Reactor, NUREG-1369, Washington, DC, December 1991.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John Sackett .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Sackett, J. (2012). Unprotected Transients. In: Waltar, A., Todd, D., Tsvetkov, P. (eds) Fast Spectrum Reactors. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9572-8_15

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9572-8_15

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-9571-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-9572-8

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics