Abstract
Even if, at first sight, deciding whether to respect obligations and coordinating cooperation seems two unrelated behaviors, they are both grounded in the social rationality of agents: in fact, they depend on the ability of predicting the actions of other agents. In this paper, we present a proposal for managing anticipatory coordination, which is used to regulate the autonomy of and to control agents in a definition of cooperation among agents and in a framework for dealing with obligations.
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Boella, G. (2003). Obligations and Cooperation: Two Sides of Social Rationality. In: Hexmoor, H., Castelfranchi, C., Falcone, R. (eds) Agent Autonomy. Multiagent Systems, Artificial Societies, and Simulated Organizations, vol 7. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9198-0_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9198-0_5
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